The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law

Catholic Law Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2022

Religious Liberty and Judicial Deference
Mark L. Rienzi

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Supreme Court of the
United States Commons

NDL106_RIENZI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/7/2022 1:32 PM

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AN D JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE
Mark L. Rienzi*
Many of the Supreme Court’s most tragic failures to protect constitutional
rights—cases like Plessy v. Ferguson, Buck v. Bell, and Korematsu v. United
States—share a common approach: an almost insuperable judicial deference to the
elected branches of government. In the modern era, this approach is often called
“Thayerism,” after James Bradley Thayer, a nineteenth-century proponent of the notion
that courts should not invalidate actions of the legislature as unconstitutional unless
they were clearly irrational. Versions of Thayerism have been around for centuries,
predating Thayer himself.
The Supreme Court took a decidedly Thayerian approach to the First Amendment
in the first flag salute case, Minersville School District v. Gobitis. That approach
was short-lived, as Gobitis was swiftly overruled in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette. Rather than deferring to political actors, Barnette treated
the Constitution as placing certain rights “beyond the reach of majorities” and establishing them as “legal principles” that must be “applied by the courts.” Barnette’s
approach to rights—rejecting a Thayerian “duty of deference” for First Amendment
rights—has largely triumphed, even in other individual rights contexts.
But a curious anomaly persists. Unlike in other areas of the law, the discredited
Thayerian approach to the First Amendment from Gobitis was eventually adopted into
the modern free exercise standard embraced by the Supreme Court in Employment
Division v. Smith. As a result, many free exercise claims have been decided with
precisely the kind of rational basis deference we long ago abandoned for other constitutional rights.
This Article examines the relationship between religious liberty claims and
Thayerian judicial deference. With the Supreme Court poised to reconsider Smith, this
focus on deference differs from the standard scholarly and judicial approach, which
tends to emphasize the debate over religious exemptions. Focusing instead on deference
shows how Smith is an outlier, out of step not only with prior religious liberty cases but
also with our broader approach to the enforcement of constitutional rights. Likewise,
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when religious liberty is viewed through the lens of deference, it becomes clear that, even
without overruling Smith, the Supreme Court has been moving away from Thayerian
judicial deference across a wide range of religious liberty disputes over the past decade.
These deference-rejecting decisions cast the Religion Clauses as the “the heart of our
pluralistic society,” that help “foster a society in which people of all beliefs can live together in harmony.” Those high goals are only attainable if religious liberty consists of
judicially enforceable rights, rather than occasions for deference to the majoritarian
governments that the Bill of Rights is supposed to constrain.
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INTRODUCTION
Eighty years ago, the Supreme Court decided a pair of cases about
whether the government could force children from a minority religious group to pledge allegiance to the American flag. The two cases
reached opposite results, with one allowing the forced pledge and one
invalidating it. The key difference between the two was a shift in the
Court’s view on the question of deference: How much should judges defer to political actors?
In the first case, Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940), the
Court ruled that the government could force the Jehovah’s Witness
children to salute the flag.1 The Gobitis Court fully understood the
children’s religious objection, and claimed to view the minority’s rights
of conscience as “so subtle and so dear.”2 But the Court thought it had
a “duty of deference”3 that obligated it to yield to the local majority’s
view that coercion would instill patriotic impulses in children.4
The deferential approach taken in Gobitis was not new. As James
Bradley Thayer explained in 1893, there had long been a strain of judicial thinking that urged courts to defer to rational legislative decisions, even on constitutional questions.5 “Thayerism,” as the approach
became known, can be seen in a host of infamous constitutional rights
cases, including Plessy v. Ferguson,6 Buck v. Bell,7 and Korematsu v. United
States.8 Justice Felix Frankfurter, who wrote the Court’s opinion in Gobitis, was an acolyte of Thayer and thought Thayer’s 1893 essay setting
forth this deferential approach “was the most important thing ever
written about the Constitution.”9
The Court’s embrace of judicial deference in Gobitis was shortlived. Just three years later, in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
1 See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599–600 (1940), overruled by W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
2 Id. at 594.
3 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 667 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
4 See Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 599.
5 See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 140 (1893).
6 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
7 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205–208 (1927).
8 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
9 NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 31 (2010); see also HARLAN B. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES: RECORDED IN TALKS WITH DR. HARLAN B. PHILLIPS 300–01 (Harlan B. Phillips ed.,
Anchor Books 1962) (1960) (in which Frankfurter calls Thayer’s 1893 article the “most
important single essay” about American constitutional law and “the great guide for
judges”).
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Barnette, the Court announced essentially an anti-Thayerian approach
to the First Amendment.10 Eschewing deference, Barnette endorsed
“the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order” and said that, even on a majority vote, “no official, high or petty”
could force minorities to embrace the majority’s orthodoxy in religion
or other matters.11 In the Barnette view, protecting minority beliefs and
practices from majority coercion is the very point of the Bill of Rights.
Where important minority rights are threatened by majoritarian government, courts cannot merely defer.
I want to suggest that this conflict over deference is actually at the
heart of much of our modern religious liberty jurisprudence. To be
sure, the conventional wisdom is that the deferential Thayerian approach to the First Amendment set forth in Gobitis is dead, and that the
Barnette approach of judicial enforcement of constitutional rights controls.12 That conventional wisdom is mostly correct: Barnette’s nondeferential understanding of how courts and the Constitution protect
rights is broadly embraced by Justices and commentators across the
ideological spectrum.13 Barnette even transcends the First Amendment
and is often invoked as a key precedent for understanding how constitutional rights work in other important individual rights contexts.14
This approach to rights is widely understood as providing essential judicial protection for minority rights and pluralism.15
But that approach has not yet fully extended to religious liberty.
Nearly fifty years after Barnette, the Supreme Court actually relied on
Gobitis in 1990 when it embraced a restrictive approach to the Free Exercise Clause in Employment Division v. Smith.16 While the Court had
10 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
11 Id.
12 See infra Section II.B.
13 See infra Section II.B.
14 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 677 (2015) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S.
at 638, for the idea that “certain subjects” were meant to be withdrawn “from the vicissitudes
of political controversy . . . plac[ing] them beyond the reach of majorities and officials
and . . . establish[ing] them as legal principles to be applied by the courts”); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, for
the proposition “that a State may not compel or enforce one view” on an issue when it
would “intrude upon a protected liberty”), overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2284 (2022).
15 See, e.g., John D. Inazu, A Confident Pluralism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 587, 591–92 (2015)
(quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642, for the proposition that “[a] confident pluralism maintains that we can” live with differences; “in fact, we must embrace a ‘right to differ’ from
state and majoritarian norms”); Holning Lau, Pluralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights, 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 317, 349 (2007) (“The Court planted the seed of the pluralism
principle in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.”).
16 See Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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previously taken a Barnette-style approach in religious liberty cases,
Smith relied instead on Gobitis as correctly stating the general rule of
deference, namely that the Free Exercise Clause offers little protection
against many general laws imposed by legislative majorities.17
Most scholars of the Smith decision have justifiably focused on the
issue of religious exemptions.18 That makes sense, because Smith
framed exemptions as the central issue.19 But I argue here that much
can be learned from looking at Smith through the lens of the competing approaches to deference that motivated the Gobitis-to-Barnette reversal. At a time when the Supreme Court seems poised to reconsider
Smith, this analysis of free exercise law through the lens of deference
can help both to elucidate why Smith was wrong, and why it has remained so out of step with the Court’s treatment of virtually all other
individual rights.
Close attention to the question of deference also provides the best
explanation for the past decade of Supreme Court religious liberty decisions. A string of recent decisions—involving a wide variety of religious liberty claims, a diverse group of religious plaintiffs, and often
broad cross sections of the Court coming to surprising agreement—
suggests that the Supreme Court is rejecting the deferential Thayerian
approach to religious liberty. The Court has repeatedly emphasized
the First Amendment’s role as the “guarantee [that] lies at the heart
of our pluralistic society”20—something the First Amendment simply
could not do under a deferential Gobitis understanding of rights. And
while both Gobitis and Smith seemed to fear judicial enforcement of the
Religion Clauses, the Court’s recent cases, including last Term’s unanimous decision in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,21 suggest that the Court
17 See id. at 879. Surprisingly, Smith relied on Gobitis without indicating that it had
been overruled. See id.
18 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1114–28 (1990) (discussing the textual, historical, and precedential
arguments for and against exemptions); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1990) [hereinafter
McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding] (arguing that the historical evidence, on
balance, supports exemptions); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916 (1992) (arguing that the
evidence does not support a constitutional right to religious exemptions).
19 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
20 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020). Six Justices joined the opinion in Bostock (Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kagan). Justices Alito and Kavanaugh joined the similar statement
in American Legion v. American Humanist Association that the “Religion Clauses of the Constitution aim to foster a society in which people of all beliefs can live together harmoniously.”
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019).
21 Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
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views such enforcement as both necessary and salutary for the Clause
to help “foster a society in which people of all beliefs can live together
harmoniously.”22 In the process, these cases have brought the Court’s
religious liberty jurisprudence into closer alignment with its treatment
of other fundamental rights.
This Article has five parts. Part I explores the deference-based
Thayerian understanding of constitutional rights that led to the
Court’s willingness to defer to school boards about the forced flag salute in Gobitis. Part II then discusses the prompt rejection of this deferential approach to individual rights in Barnette’s overruling of Gobitis.
Part III explores how the Court’s leading Free Exercise precedent,
Smith, is best understood as embracing the Thayerian deference of Gobitis. Part IV analyzes the Court’s efforts over the past decade to reorient the law of religious liberty away from the narrow, deferential approach and toward the path of judicial protection for minority rights
and pluralism described in Barnette. Part V concludes by discussing the
prospects for the Court’s ultimate success in fully eradicating the impact of Thayerian judicial deference on religious liberty and fully embracing the First Amendment as a strong and enforceable protection
for peaceful pluralism amidst differences.
I.

THAYERISM, GOBITIS, AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

Gobitis and Barnette reached opposite answers on the question of
whether governments can impose a forced flag salute and pledge on
unwilling students. That outcome was and remains important, both
for the particular students and communities affected, and for a free
society more broadly.
That difference in outcomes is attributable to an even more important difference between Gobitis and Barnette on the question of deference. The cases differ sharply as to how and whether judges should
defer to political actors. As will be discussed later, understanding Gobitis and Barnette through this lens sheds important light on the modern approach to religious liberty, both because the Court would later
adopt the Gobitis approach of deference in Smith, and because the
more recent religious liberty cases are best explained as a broad rejection of such deference.
At the time of Gobitis, thinking about the judicial role was heavily
influenced by James Bradley Thayer’s paper “The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law.”23 Alexander Bickel
22
23

Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2074.
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 35 (2d ed., Yale University Press 1986) (1962).
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deemed Thayer’s article a “singularly important piece of American legal scholarship,” because of its influence on Holmes, Brandeis and the
Justice who would write Gobitis, Felix Frankfurter.24 Frankfurter would
later call Thayer’s argument the “most important single essay” about
American constitutional law and “the great guide for judges.”25
A. Thayer’s Theory: “Whatever Choice Is Rational Is Constitutional.”
Thayer argued that courts presented with constitutional questions
actually were not supposed to decide whether a law is unconstitutional
“upon a just and true construction.”26 Instead of deploying their own
constitutional analysis, Thayer argued that judges should apply a version of what today we might call a “clear mistake” rule or “rational
basis” test. Under it, courts can only invalidate an act of the political
branches as unconstitutional “when those who have the right to make
laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,—
so clear that it is not open to rational question.”27 Thayer argued that
because “the constitution often admits of different interpretations”
and “there is often a range of choice and judgment,” courts should
approach constitutional questions with the approach that “whatever
choice is rational is constitutional.”28
Thayer supported this approach largely out of separation-of-powers concerns. He argued that state and federal constitutions had carefully separated legislative power from judicial power to ensure “a government of laws, and not of men.”29 Federal judges had not been given
the authority to sit as a third branch of the legislature—they were not
a “Council of Revision” to look over laws as they were enacted, but
24 Id. Richard Posner would later describe Justice Frankfurter colorfully as having
“advocated Thayerism with a noisy passion unequaled by any other Thayerian.” Richard A.
Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519, 530 (2012).
25 Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Learned Hand: The Jurisprudential Trajectory of an Old Progressive, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 873, 885 (1995) (reviewing GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE
MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994)) (quoting PHILLIPS, supra note 9, at 300–01).
26 Thayer, supra note 5, at 144.
27 Id.
28 Id. Edward Purcell has argued that Thayer intended his deferential standard to
apply only when the courts are revising the work of coordinate branches of the federal government (since that was Thayer’s chief focus) and not to actions by the states. See Purcell,
supra note 25, at 886. As Purcell notes, this is not necessarily how Thayer’s theory was understood by his adherents at the time. See id. And as Gobitis demonstrates, it was not how
Frankfurter and his colleagues applied the theory. As Michael Perry has observed, “[e]ven
Frankfurter failed to note the distinction—or to heed it, as his dissent in Barnette makes
clear.” Michael J. Perry, Is Capital Punishment Unconstitutional? And Even If We Think It Is,
Should We Want the Supreme Court to So Rule?, 41 GA. L. REV. 867, 872 n.13 (2007).
29 Thayer, supra note 5, at 134 (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXX).
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instead had been given only the power to decide particular cases that
came before them.30 Courts needed to be careful not to invalidate a
law “merely because it is concluded that upon a just and true construction the law is unconstitutional.”31 Legislators, rather than judges, had
to be given room to balance the “complex, ever-unfolding exigencies
of government.”32 Judicial balancing of such concerns must be
avoided, lest it turn the court “into a board for answering legislative
conundrums.”33
Thayer thought this deferential approach was beneficial not only
for the courts but also for the legislative process. He believed that judicial review might diminish the likelihood of serious constitutional
consideration by the legislature and, ultimately, the people.34 Thayer
feared that a robust allowance for judicial enforcement of the Constitution would leave legislatures indifferent to questions of constitutionality: “if we are wrong, they say, the courts will correct it.”35 His goal in
limiting judicial review to a search for irrationality was to expound “the
clear limits of judicial power; so that responsibility may be brought
sharply home where it belongs,” namely to the people and the legislature.36
Thayer did not focus his argument on individual rights. He was
writing at a time before the Supreme Court had “incorporated” the Bill
of Rights, and his article focused largely on structural aspects of the
Constitution.37 But his followers—including both Learned Hand and
Justice Frankfurter—would apply Thayer’s rule to the Bill of Rights.
Hand, for example, reached the “conclusion that courts should defer
to legislative judgments even when First Amendment claims were at
stake.”38 While giving the 1958 Oliver Wendell Holmes lecture at Harvard Law School, Hand argued that Thayer’s rule of rationality should
apply to cases brought under the Bill of Rights.39 Ronald Dworkin

30 Id. at 136 n.1, 136–37.
31 Id. at 144.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 146.
34 See id. at 155–56; see also BICKEL, supra note 23, at 40.
35 Thayer, supra note 5, at 155–56.
36 Id. at 156.
37 Of course, as the Court has often acknowledged, the structural and separation of
powers aspects of the Constitution were in fact designed to protect individual liberty. See,
e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221–22 (2011).
38 Purcell, supra note 25, at 874; see LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES, 1958, at 56 (1958) (“I do not think that the interests mentioned in the First Amendment are entitled in point of constitutional interpretation to a
measure of protection different from other interests . . . .”).
39 See HAND, supra note 38, at 56; see also BICKEL, supra note 23, at 46–49.

NDL106_RIENZI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

11/7/2022 1:32 PM

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

345

described Hand’s extension of Thayer’s views into the area of individual rights as “the strongest doctrine of [judicial] restraint ever defended by a major judicial figure.”40
How strong was that doctrine of judicial restraint? It was strong
enough that it eventually led both Hand and Frankfurter to doubt the
legitimacy of the Court’s unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education.41 For Hand, that doubt was expressed publicly, in his Holmes
Lectures at Harvard.42 There, he argued that Brown looked like it was
just a judicial rebalancing of interests that the legislature had already
conducted, rather than application of a constitutional principle
against racial classifications.43 If segregation was simply an available
rational choice of the legislature, then the Court would be impermissibly acting as a “third legislative chamber” to reverse it.44
In his biography of Hand, Gerald Gunther argues that Hand’s interpretation of Brown “came directly from Felix Frankfurter.”45 This
may seem odd, given that Frankfurter signed onto the unanimous decision in Brown. But Frankfurter had reason to want Brown to be interpreted narrowly: he feared that extending Brown to invalidate bans on
interracial marriage would imperil the Court’s legitimacy and jeopardize desegregation.46 Frankfurter therefore argued, and Hand eventually agreed, that Brown was not a broad statement of constitutional
principle after all, but rather a limited decision that only concerned
the field of public education.47 This move created room to say that
Brown would not necessarily invalidate bans on interracial marriage. It
also meant that, in Thayerian terms, Brown was illegitimate because the
Court should have left such context-dependent balancing to the legislature, “and this had to be condemned by Hand.”48
B. Thayerism in Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu
By design, Thayer’s theory of judicial review leaves only a very
small role for judges to enforce the Constitution. In practice, such an
approach means that the Constitution will provide very little
40

RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CON339 (1996).
41 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42 See HAND, supra note 38, at 54–55.
43 See id. (suggesting that what Brown did was “‘overrule’ the ‘legislative judgment’ of
states by its own reappraisal of the relative values at stake”).
44 Id. at 55.
45 GUNTHER, supra note 25, at 666; see also Purcell, supra note 25, at 921–22.
46 See GUNTHER, supra note 25, at 666–71.
47 See id. at 667–71.
48 Id. at 671.
STITUTION
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protection for individual rights. If courts are forbidden from consulting their own best understanding of what the Constitution requires
and must instead accept all government actions based on all nonirrational interpretations of the Constitution, then the Constitution will
almost never provide enforceable protection against majoritarian government power.
It is therefore unsurprising that Thayerism is evident in many
cases that are rightly regarded as judicial failures to protect minority
rights against the power of majoritarian government. Consider, for
example, the Court’s infamous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, which was
decided just three years after Thayer’s essay.49 Faced with a constitutional provision that guaranteed the “equal protection of the laws,” the
Court found that the constitutional question “reduces itself to the
question whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation.”50
To make matters worse, the Plessy Court emphasized that this reasonableness test “must necessarily” recognize “a large discretion on
the part of the legislature.”51 The reasonableness test must further allow the state to act based on the established “usages” and “customs” of
the people to further the “promotion of their comfort.”52 Applying
this standard, the Court said it could not say that segregation was “unreasonable”53—thus condemning the country and the Constitution to
the next half century of Jim Crow laws.
Plessy vividly illustrates the problem Thayerism creates for the judicial protection of constitutional rights. If constitutional rights can
be reduced to a mere reasonableness test, then those rights offer very
little protection. That is especially true where that reasonableness test
allows for “large discretion” on the part of the elected branches of government.54 Legislatures can, of course, still choose to protect rights
when they wish; but courts will only rarely see fit to require protection
when the majoritarian legislature chooses not to provide it.55
49 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
50 Id. at 548, 550 (emphasis added).
51 Id. at 550.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 550–51.
54 Id. at 550.
55 Plessy’s embrace of Thayerism in the Fourteenth Amendment context is particularly
troublesome given that the Amendment’s supporters clearly intended for it to provide
strong, enforceable constitutional protections against legislative infringements. For example, in language that seems to foreshadow Barnette, then-Congressman James Garfield explained about the possibility of his political opponents taking away statutory civil rights:
The civil rights bill is now a part of the law of the land. But every gentleman knows
it will cease to be a part of the law whenever the sad moment arrives when that
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Thayerism can also be seen in Justice Holmes’s opinion for the
Court in Buck v. Bell, in which it denied protection for an eighteenyear-old “feeble-minded” woman, who was forcibly sterilized by the
State of Virginia.56 The state legislature had authorized forced sterilizations of “mental defectives” and the Court refused to second-guess
the legislature’s prerogative to require sterilization of what it called
“the probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring.”57
The Court grounded its holding in the reasonableness standard
from Jacobson v. Massachusetts,58 which held that states could impose
health restrictions amid “the pressure of great dangers” so long as they
were “reasonable.”59 The Buck Court thought it reasonable for the
State to sterilize those who are “manifestly unfit” so as “to prevent our
being swamped with incompetence.”60 The Court also suggested that
the legislature’s line drawing about whom to sterilize should not be
second-guessed.61
Thayerian deference is also the centerpiece of Korematsu.62 Although Korematsu begins with the claim that the Court must impose
“the most rigid scrutiny” because laws restricting civil rights by racial
group are “immediately suspect,” the Court’s actual analysis applied
Thayerian deference.63 At every turn, the Court emphasized its own
inability or unwillingness to second-guess the judgments of Congress
gentleman’s party comes into power. It is precisely for that reason that we propose to
lift that great and good law above the reach of political strife, beyond the reach of the plots
and machinations of any party, and fix it in the serene sky, in the eternal firmament of the
Constitution, where no storm of passion can shake it and no cloud can obscure it.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2462 (1866) (emphasis added). Congressman Garfield
would surely have been surprised to learn that a later Supreme Court would think the only
thing they had raised “above the reach of political strife” and fixed into the “eternal firmament of the Constitution” was a bare reasonableness test.
56 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205–08 (1927).
57 Id. at 205, 207 (“In view of the general declarations of the legislature and the specific findings of the Court, obviously we cannot say as matter of law that the grounds do not
exist, and if they exist they justify the result.”).
58 See id. at 207.
59 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (“[T]he individual in respect of
his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint,
to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand.”);
see id. at 31 (“Whatever may be thought of the expediency of this statute, it cannot be affirmed to be, beyond question, in palpable conflict with the Constitution.”).
60 Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (“Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”).
61 See id. at 208 (“But the answer is that the law does all that is needed when it does
all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to bring within
the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its means allow.”).
62 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
63 Id. at 216.
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or the military authorities.64 As Thayer had said, “whatever choice is
rational is constitutional,”65 and the Korematsu Court thought Japanese
internment was at least rational in the circumstances.
The common theme in all of these cases is that the Court allowed
a significant infringement on liberty without any significant scrutiny of
the government’s claimed reasons for the infringement. As we shall
see below, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court in Gobitis took a
similarly deferential approach to the Bill of Rights, in which the Court
could only intervene to protect constitutional liberties if it found the
legislature’s law irrational.
C. Thayerism in Gobitis
1. Background: “I love my country and I love God more.”
Ten-year-old Billy Gobitas loved his country. But he loved God
first and believed that complying with his school’s requirement to
pledge allegiance to the American flag was forbidden by God.66 So, in
1935, he wrote a letter to school officials explaining that he could not
salute the flag. Considering it a form of idol worship, Billy cited the
Book of Exodus.67 He explained that God enjoined the people not to
make “any graven image, nor bow down to them.”68 Echoing the Madisonian formulation of religious duties preceding political ones,69 Billy
emphasized that he did love his country, but had to obey God: “I do
not salute the flag not because I do not love my country, but I love my
country and I love God more and I must obey His commandments.”70

64 See id. at 218 (“[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities . . . .” (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943))); id. (“We
cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have ground for believing that . . . .” (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99)); id. at 219 (“[W]e could not reject
the finding of the military authorities . . . .”); id. at 224 (“We cannot—by availing ourselves
of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions were unjustified.”).
65 Thayer, supra note 5, at 144.
66 See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591–92 (1940), overruled by W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
67 Letter from Billy Gobitas to Minersville, Pa. Sch. Dirs. (Nov. 5, 1935),
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mcc.016/?sp=1 [https://perma.cc/D6CM-ZNT8].
The
family name of “Gobitas” was misspelled in court reports as “Gobitis.”
68 Id.
69 See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments [ca. 20
June] 1785, NATIONAL ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE (Jun. 20, 1785), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0163 [https://perma.cc/EJP3-RSS3].
70 Letter from Billy Gobitas to Minersville, Pa. Sch. Dirs., supra note 67.
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As a result of his refusal, Billy and his family endured harassment,
expulsion, and boycotts of the family store.71 The family eventually
sued the school board, arguing that being forced to say the pledge violated their constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.72
The family won in both the trial court and the court of appeals,
with both courts insisting that government can only force someone to
violate his or her religious beliefs if it can prove such coercion is necessary to the protection of important governmental interests.73 Neither
court suggested that judges should simply defer to any rational choice
by the legislature.74 Eventually, however, the family lost their case at
the Supreme Court, where the Justices felt compelled to defer to the
views of the school board.75
2. Deference trumps constitutional enforcement
The Court’s decision against the religious liberty claim in Gobitis
reflects the narrow, Thayerian view of the role of courts in protecting
even constitutionally enumerated rights. Three themes emerge:
a. Legislatures over Courts
The Gobitis decision was chiefly driven by the Thayerian belief that
legislatures, rather than courts, should have primary responsibility for
protecting constitutional rights. This principle was evident in Gobitis
itself and was expounded at greater length in Justice Frankfurter’s Barnette dissent, in which he defended the Gobitis approach.
To the Gobitis Court, the Jehovah’s Witness plaintiffs should have
addressed their plea for protection to the political branches of the government. The Justices explained that “the courtroom is not the arena
for debating issues of educational policy.”76 Rather it is for legislators,
not judges, “to choose among competing considerations in the subtle
process of securing effective loyalty to the traditional ideals of democracy.”77 They maintained that it is for legislators, not judges, to think

71

See KEVIN SEAMUS HASSON, BELIEVERS, THINKERS, AND FOUNDERS: HOW WE CAME
22–24 (2016); James F. Van Orden, “Jehovah Will Provide”:
Lillian Gobitas and Freedom of Religion, 29 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 136, 141 (2004).
72 See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683, 684 (3d Cir. 1939); Gobitis v.
Minersville Sch. Dist., 21 F. Supp. 581, 583 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
73 See Gobitis, 108 F.2d at 692; Gobitis, 21 F. Supp. at 584.
74 See Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683; Gobitis, 21 F. Supp. 581
75 See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940), overruled by W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
76 Id.
77 Id.
TO BE ONE NATION UNDER GOD
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about how to simultaneously respect “individual idiosyncracies [sic]
among a people so diversified in racial origins and religious allegiances.”78
Like Thayer, the Gobitis Court thought that leaving such issues to
the legislature was a matter of both proper judicial role and good training in democratic impulses. As to judicial role, the Court believed that
granting judicial protection for religious minorities under the First
Amendment “would in effect make us the school board for the country,” which the Court thought was beyond its constitutional authority.79
Protection for “the most precious interests of civilization” therefore
needs to be found in the legislature rather than through seeking “vindication in courts of law.”80
Like Thayer before him, Justice Frankfurter viewed the lack of judicial authority over the protection of individual rights as a good thing.
Leaving most of the protection of constitutional rights to the political
branches would force the people to “fight out the wise use of legislative
authority,” and would “serve[] to vindicate the self-confidence of a
free people” better than transferring the contest “to the judicial
arena.”81
This view of the proper role for courts in turn dictated Justice
Frankfurter’s understanding of the single available test the Court could
apply for constitutionality.
b. Deference to Rational Legislative Choices
Because it viewed legislatures as the primary guardians of individual liberty, the Gobitis Court asserted that courts should almost always
defer to legislative policy choices. Gobitis acknowledged a few rare exceptions—chiefly if the laws were targeted against a particular group
(i.e., “directed against doctrinal loyalties of particular sects”)82 or when
the political branches are somehow broken (i.e., when “the effective

78 Id.
79 Id.
80 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 671 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). In 1944, Justice Frankfurter would adopt a similarly deferential approach to
the political branches in Korematsu, in which he viewed the constitutionality of Japanese
internment as a decision for the legislative and executive branches: “That is their business,
not ours.” Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
81 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 600; cf. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 671 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(“Only a persistent positive translation of the faith of a free society into the convictions and
habits and actions of a community is the ultimate reliance against unabated temptations to
fetter the human spirit.”).
82 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594.
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means of inducing political changes” are not “free from interference”).83 But it otherwise endorsed judicial deference to legislatures.84
Like Thayer, Gobitis described this deference to the legislature in
terms consistent with what today we would call “rational basis” review.
So long as “the end is legitimate,” the courts should not “deny the legislature the right to select appropriate means.”85 Legislatures should
not be “barred from determining the appropriateness of various
means” and courts should not “stigmatize legislative judgment” by putting certain choices “beyond the pale of legislative power.”86 Rather
than “exercise censorship over the conviction of legislatures,” courts
should instead defer to legislative choices.87
The Court also emphasized that it could not second-guess the governing majority’s choice of means. It believed that it could not “deny
the legislature the right to select appropriate means for [the] attainment” of national unity.88 Indeed, the Court thought it would improperly “stigmatize legislative judgment” and “amount to no less than the
pronouncement of pedagogical and psychological dogma” for a court
to do so.89 Nor could the Court allow for an exemption only for those
students with a conscientious objection as it “might cast doubts in the
minds of the other children” and thereby weaken the show of unity the
majority sought to create.90 Everyone must conform; no exceptions.
Justice Frankfurter expounded this point further when defending
Gobitis in his Barnette dissent. There, he took the position that, even
for rights expressly described in the Bill of Rights, “[i]n no instance is
this Court the primary protector of the particular liberty that is invoked.”91 Thus, “even though legislation relates to civil liberties,” the
Court has a “duty of deference” to political actors who make the laws.92
The only question the Gobitis approach deems appropriate for constitutional provisions is essentially modern rational basis review:
“[W]hether legislators could in reason have enacted such a law” to
pursue “a legitimate . . . end.”93

83 Id. at 600.
84 See id.
85 Id. at 598, 595.
86 Id. at 597–98.
87 Id. at 599.
88 Id. at 595.
89 Id. at 597.
90 Id. at 600.
91 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
92 Id. at 667.
93 Id. at 647.
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Justice Frankfurter emphasized his belief that what we would today call “rational basis review” was the only constitutional test available
to the Court. Frankfurter thought that judges were authorized to
check only for “the absence of a rational justification for the legislation.”94 But he professed “know[ing] of no other test which this Court
is authorized to apply in nullifying legislation.”95 Like Thayer before
him, Frankfurter thought if a law was rational, the Court must stand
aside and defer to the legislative majority that enacted it.96
As discussed below, Justice Frankfurter believed this limitation on
the judicial role would have salutary effects because of what he saw as
inherent dangers in judicial enforcement of constitutional rights.
c. Fear of Anarchy
Gobitis also explained that, notwithstanding the First Amendment’s protection for free speech and religious exercise, “[c]onscientious scruples” could not be permitted to “relieve[] the individual
from obedience.”97 The Court believed that to protect the Jehovah’s
Witnesses under the First Amendment would mean that “the freedom
to follow conscience has itself no limits” and would undermine, rather
than further, the pluralism that “underlies [the] protection of religious toleration.”98
Justice Frankfurter continued this argument in his Barnette dissent, where he explained that judicial protection of the Jehovah’s Witnesses would elevate individual conscience above the law.99 Doing so
would court anarchy, as the religious objector “might refuse to contribute [to] taxes.”100 Justice Frankfurter offered the example of
forced Bible reading in schools, explaining how judicial enforcement
of the First Amendment might lead to challenges by “parents of the
94 Id. at 666.
95 Id.
96 Stephen Gard has aptly described Justice Frankfurter’s test as one that “negatively
define[s] the freedom of speech guaranteed by the first amendment as that speech which
no reasonable person could conceive of a reason to suppress.” Stephen W. Gard, The Flag
Salute Cases and the First Amendment, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 419, 433 (1982). Gard also explains
how “in the hands of Justice Frankfurter this test operated like a rachet to contract progressively the scope of constitutionally protected liberty” because once the Court had decided
Gobitis, of course it would be reasonable for legislatures to think a forced flag salute was
permissible. Id.
97 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940), overruled by Barnette, 319
U.S. 624.
98 Id.
99 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 655 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 657 (quoting Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 268
(1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring)).
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Catholic and Jewish faiths and of some Protestant persuasions” against
the required use of the King James Bible.101 Such an approach to the
First Amendment would deny to the majority the ability to enact requirements that “seem essential for the welfare of the state” because
they “may offend the consciences of a minority.”102 To Justice Frankfurter, that would wrongly suggest “that the consciences of a minority
are more sacred and more enshrined in the Constitution than the consciences of a majority.”103
*

*

*

On these grounds, the Gobitis Court held that it was permissible
for governments to punish members of a religious minority for their
refusal to engage in speech and conduct demanded by the majority.
As the Court saw it, neither the First Amendment nor any other law
gave judges the authority to intervene or to second-guess the legislature’s balancing of interests. As Thayer had prescribed a half-century
earlier, Gobitis said courts must defer.
II.

BARNETTE’S REJECTION OF DEFERENCE

Gobitis embraced a Thayerian judicial approach in which courts
defer to rational government action, even in individual rights cases.
Had Gobitis survived and been broadly adopted, it would have left the
Constitution and the courts largely out of the project of protecting
rights. Those with minority views or practices would instead be consigned to hoping that the legislature—controlled by the majority—
would choose to grant protections for the minority.
Barnette, however, firmly rejected both the conclusion of Gobitis
(that forced flag salutes were permissible) and, more importantly for
our purposes, its reasoning about judicial deference. This Part will discuss Barnette’s rejection of Thayerian deference in the First Amendment context and how it will come to set the standard for modern constitutional rights jurisprudence, in which the Constitution provides
meaningful—and judicially enforceable—protections for constitutional rights, even in the face of rational restrictions imposed by the
majority. Examining Barnette’s rejection of Thayerian deference and
its broad impact on the law will then set the stage for understanding
both the oddity of the Court’s reembrace of Gobitis in Smith (Part III

101
102
103

Id. at 659.
Id. at 662.
Id.
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below) and the Court’s more recent return to Barnette principles across
a variety of religious liberty contexts (Part IV).
A. Barnette and Judicial Protection of Rights
The lone dissenter in Gobitis, Harlan Fiske Stone, thought the
Court’s Thayerian deference to the legislature was its “surrender of the
constitutional protection of the liberty of small minorities to the popular will.”104 Instead of having judicially enforceable constitutional
rights to believe and act according to different ideas than the majority,
Gobitis sanctioned what was essentially might-makes-right majority control. This ability of the majority to control the speech and actions of
the minority was to be largely unchecked by the courts. So long as the
majority’s goal was “legitimate” and the law was “general,” Gobitis said
courts would not interfere.105 This was Thayer’s theory brought to bear
on the First Amendment, and it left a targeted minority without enforceable constitutional protections.
The Court’s treatment of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Gobitis
sparked a wave of increased anti-Witness violence.106 As Noah Feldman
has observed, the decision was understood by many Americans as announcing “open season on the Witnesses.”107 Mobs attacked Witnesses
across the country, including beatings, draggings through the street,
and forced marches out of town.108 Witness meeting houses were
looted and burned. Some Witnesses were force-fed castor oil and publicly soiled themselves; a Nebraska man was castrated.109

104 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 606 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting),
overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
105 See id. at 594–98 (majority opinion).
106 See SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 8–13 (2000) (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s
notorious ruling in the Gobitis flag-salute case, handed down in June 1940, helped to ignite
some of the worst anti-Witness violence of the period.”); id. at 13 (“From 1938 to 1946,
when the persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses was reaching almost epidemic proportions in
some parts of the United States, the Court handed down twenty-three opinions covering a
total of thirty-nine Witness-related cases.”); DAVID T. SMITH, RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND
POLITICAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 119–22 (2015); see also Garrett Epps, America’s New
Lesson in Tolerance, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/americas-new-lesson-in-tolerance/498404/
[https://perma.cc/EB2R-2N9E].
107 FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 185. The violence prompted Eleanor Roosevelt to ask,
“[m]ust we drag people out of their homes to force them to do something which is in opposition to their religion?” ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, MY DAY: THE BEST OF ELEANOR ROOSEVELT’S ACCLAIMED NEWSPAPER COLUMNS, 1936–1962, at 46 (David Emblidge ed., 2001).
108 See PETERS, supra note 106, at 8–11.
109 See id. at 9, 91–95.
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All told, the Department of Justice received more than three hundred complaints of mob violence against Witnesses, spanning fortyfour states, in 1940 alone.110 Law enforcement sometimes looked the
other way, believing they had the Supreme Court’s blessing: “They’re
traitors—the Supreme Court says so.”111 The ACLU called the violence
against a religious minority “unparalleled in America since the attacks
on the Mormons.”112 In some states, governments moved to take away
the children of Witness families, to make them wards of the state.113
By 1942, however, the tide had already begun to turn. The narrow
view of the judicial role in enforcing the Bill of Rights was rejected by
three of the Justices from the Gobitis decision. While dissenting in Jones
v. Opelika,114 Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy disavowed their Gobitis votes and explained how such deference to political actors was incompatible with a free and pluralistic approach to the First Amendment.115 Where Gobitis had disclaimed any significant role for courts
enforcing the Bill of Rights in opposition to a general law, the dissenters now rejected that approach, finding instead that “the historic Bill
of Rights, has a high responsibility to accommodate itself to the religious views of minorities, however unpopular and unorthodox those
views may be.”116 Where Gobitis had left the right to free exercise dependent on the grace of the majority in the legislature, the dissenters
instead found that the “First Amendment does not put the right freely
to exercise religion in a subordinate position.”117 Moreover, they emphasized the proper role of courts in cases touching on the Bill of
Rights: “[I]t is the duty of this Court” to ensure that the legislative majority has not “impair[ed] . . . cherished freedoms in reaching its

110 ACLU, THE PERSECUTION OF JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: THE RECORD OF VIOLENCE
AGAINST A RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION UNPARALLELED IN AMERICA SINCE THE ATTACKS ON
THE MORMONS 1 (1941); see also PETERS, supra note 106, at 72–123.
111 Murad Hussain, Defending the Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group Harm in Free
Exercise Challenges to Counterterrorism Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920, 963 n.223 (2008).
112 ACLU, supra note 110.
113 Gard, supra note 96, at 425 (“In fact, however, as a result of official efforts to enforce
the requirement, parents had been subjected to the threat of imprisonment, and children
were subjected to the threat of being made wards of the state and of being removed from
the custody of their parents.”).
114 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
115 See id. at 623 (Black, Douglas & Murphy, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that the Gobitis
approach “tends to suppress the free exercise of a religion practiced by a minority group”).
116 Id. at 624.
117 Id.
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objective.”118 This is the opposite of the deferential Thayer/Gobitis approach.
The whole Court eventually revisited the question of forced flag
salutes in another Jehovah’s Witness case in 1943, West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette.119 The case concerned two young Jehovah’s Witness girls, ten-year-old Gathie and eight-year-old Marie Barnette.120 The Barnette family had made clear it was willing to compromise. While they could only pledge allegiance to God, the children
were willing to say “I respect the flag of the United States and
acknowledge it as a symbol of freedom and justice to all.”121 If that
were not enough, they were also willing to pledge “allegiance and obedience to all the laws of the United States that are consistent with God’s
law, as set forth in the Bible.”122 But the state would not budge—either
the two girls would pledge allegiance exactly as the school board told
them to, or they would be expelled and their parents punished.123
The Barnettes sued, asserting that the forced pledge “amounts to
a denial of religious liberty.”124 In light of the disavowal in Jones, the
three-judge district court panel said it did “not feel that it is incumbent
upon us to accept [Gobitis] as binding authority.”125 In particular,
where the Supreme Court had already “impaired” Gobitis as an authority, the panel did not think it “should deny protection to rights which
we regard as among the most sacred” in the Constitution.126
The panel then specifically rejected the narrow Thayer/Gobitis approach to judicial review in cases concerning constitutional liberties.
It explained that constitutional rights “would not be worth the paper”
they are written on if courts were to defer whenever legislatures saw fit
to regulate.127 The “bill of rights is not a mere guide for the exercise
of legislative discretion,” but instead “is a part of the fundamental law
118 Id. at 611 (Murphy, J., dissenting); see id. at 611–12 (“[T]he protection of the Constitution must be extended to all, not only to those whose views accord with prevailing
thought but also to dissident minorities . . . .”).
119 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
120 See Gregory L. Peterson, E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Shawn Francis Peters, Bennett
Boskey, Gathie Barnett Edmonds, Marie Barnett Snodgrass & John Q. Barrett, Recollections
of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 755, 755 (2007).
121 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 628 n.4.
122 Id.
123 See id. at 628–29.
124 Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 252 (S.D. W. Va. 1942)
(“There is, therefore, but one question for our decision, viz.: Whether children who for
religious reasons have conscientious scruples against saluting the flag of the country can
lawfully be required to salute it.”).
125 Id. at 253.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 254.
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of the land, and is to be enforced as such by the courts.”128 The panel
was particularly concerned about the “tyranny of majorities over the
rights of individuals or helpless minorities” if courts were to “abdicate
the most important duty which rests on them under the Constitution.”129 And rather than defer to other branches, the panel thought
that the “delicate and difficult task” of “apprais[ing] the substantiality
of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights” falls to the courts.130
The Supreme Court agreed with this rejection of deference and
embraced a much stronger role for the Bill of Rights—and the Court—
in protecting minority rights. The Court made clear that the limitations on government power apply to all parts of the government,
“[b]oards of [e]ducation not excepted.”131 And unlike Thayer, Gobitis,
Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu, the Barnette Court did not think it should
simply defer. Rather, while acknowledging that such boards of course
have “important” and “highly discretionary functions,” the Court emphasized that those functions must be performed “within the limits of
the Bill of Rights.”132
Barnette expressly rejected the Thayer/Gobitis approach of mere
rationality review.133 That test, Barnette explained, was appropriate for
ordinary regulations that do not touch on constitutional liberties. For
example, regulation of “a public utility may well include, so far as the
due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions
which a legislature may have a ‘rational basis’ for adopting.”134 But
Barnette adamantly rejected such a standard for First Amendment
rights, holding that “freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and
of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds.”135 Such
constitutional liberties could only be restricted to prevent “grave and
immediate” dangers.136

128 Id.
129 Id. The court further explained why serious constitutional review required judicial
analysis of any claimed threat, rather than mere deference to a legislative judgment. See id.
at 253–54 (“There is not a religious persecution in history that was not justified in the eyes
of those engaging in it on the ground that it was reasonable and right and that the persons
whose practices were suppressed were guilty of stubborn folly hurtful to the general welfare.”).
130 Id. at 254 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
131 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
132 Id.
133 See id. at 639.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
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Nor was the Barnette Court convinced that the importance of nationalism or the sensitivity of the task of educating children somehow
exempted the government from following the Constitution or the
Court from enforcing it. To the contrary, the Court explained these
are “reason[s] for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms,”
rather than against.137 The Court explained that the Constitution protects the “right to differ” not only as to “things that do not matter
much” but also “as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.”138
The Justices also made clear that they understood the dangers of
failing to provide judicial enforcement of the First Amendment to protect minorities against coercion by the majority. “Those who begin
coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”139 And the Court recognized that the First
Amendment’s protection for pluralism is a key to averting such problems: “It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment to
our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these
beginnings.”140
Barnette thus reflected a vastly different understanding of the
Court’s role in enforcing the Bill of Rights. Where Gobitis professed
powerlessness in the face of even barely rational majority will, Barnette
explained that the “very purpose of a Bill of Rights” was to place certain matters “beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”141 Fundamental rights
“may not be submitted to vote” and “depend on the outcome of no
elections.”142 And legislative majorities should not simply be given deference so long as their laws are at least rational or legitimate. Rather,
it is “the function of this Court” to “apply the Bill of Rights . . . where
the invasion of rights occurs.”143 It is difficult to imagine a more direct
rejection of Gobitis’s application of Thayer’s rule to the Bill of Rights.
In the decision’s most famous passage, the Court strongly rejects
the notion of majority-imposed orthodoxy: “If there is any fixed star in
137 Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
138 Id. at 642.
139 Id. at 641.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 638 (emphasis added).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 639–40. Barnette also noted that the Court had a continuing obligation to
enforce First Amendment protections, even as the nation changed from one in which “liberty was attainable through mere absence of governmental restraints” in the eighteenth
century to having “expanded and strengthened governmental controls” in the twentieth
century. Id.
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our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein.”144 Where Gobitis had featured judicial deference
to the legislature, Barnette now embraced a judicial duty to enforce the
Constitution and protect minority rights.
B. Barnette’s Victory over the Deference of Thayer and Gobitis
There is no real dispute about the relationship between Barnette
and Gobitis on the flag-salute question: Barnette overruled Gobitis. The
Barnette Court itself was explicit on this point.145 And, in most cases,
both Supreme Court Justices and lower courts have had little difficulty
agreeing that Gobitis has been overruled and Barnette is the law.146
Barnette is thus the unquestioned constitutional standard on the
question of forced flag salutes. But the rejection of deference embodied in Barnette has extended far beyond the flag salute context. Barnette—and, in particular, Barnette’s nondeferential approach to constitutional rights—has a revered spot in the constitutional canon. It is
influential not just in First Amendment cases, but also in other significant rights cases. Today, no one argues that courts should apply only
Thayerian rationality review when protecting fundamental rights.147

144 Id. at 642.
145 Id. (“The decision of this Court in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and the holdings of those few per curiam decisions which preceded and foreshadowed it are overruled . . . .”).
146 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
569 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“And Gobitis¸
after three Justices who originally joined the opinion renounced it for disregarding the
government’s constitutional obligation ‘to accommodate itself to the religious views of minorities,’ . . . was explicitly overruled in [Barnette].” (quoting Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584,
624 (1942) (Black, Douglas & Murphy, JJ., dissenting))); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,
714 (1977) (“In overruling its prior decision in [Gobitis] . . . .”); Parents for Priv. v. Barr,
949 F.3d 1210, 1231 n.17 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The Supreme Court, however, overruled Gobitis
three years later in [Barnette].”). A Westlaw search indicates that Barnette’s “fixed star” line
has been quoted by more than 200 published opinions, including fourteen by the Supreme
Court.
147 Ronald Dworkin observed that Judge Hand’s views about judicial restraint—based
on applying Thayer’s rule to the protection of constitutional rights—“are not much studied
in law schools now, or treated as very important.” DWORKIN, supra note 40, at 343; see also
id. at 12 (noting that Hand’s approach “was once an open possibility, [but] history has long
excluded it; practice has now settled that courts do have a responsibility to declare and act
on their best understanding of what the Constitution forbids”). As then-Judge Posner explained in 2012, “[t]he ‘rational basis’ criterion of constitutionality, a legacy of Thayer, has
dropped away.” Posner, supra note 24, at 534.
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1. Barnette’s Triumph in First Amendment Law
Given Barnette’s express statement that it “overruled” Gobitis, it is
not surprising that the Barnette understanding of the First Amendment
also controlled in the aftermath of the two cases. In the nearly fifty
years between Barnette and Employment Division v. Smith, Gobitis was
never cited as a correct statement of how the First Amendment should
operate.
Barnette, on the other hand, was treated as the controlling decision. In fact, in the years after the two decisions, the Court’s overruling
of Gobitis was frequently cited as an example of the Court’s willingness
to reverse prior constitutional decisions when it realized they were incorrect. For example, just the Term after Barnette, the Court cited Barnette in Smith v. Allwright, overruling prior precedent to eliminate racebased qualifications in primary elections.148 Although Barnette’s First
Amendment holding was not at issue, the Court relied on it for the
proposition that “when convinced of former error,” the Court had
“freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional
decisions” in what has “long been accepted practice.”149 Such use of
Barnette remains common to the present day.150
This was certainly understood to be true as to the merits of the
First Amendment claims. Thus, shortly after Barnette, the Court cited
it in United States v. Ballard for the proposition that “freedom of religious belief” is “basic in a society of free men” and “embraces the right
to maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are
rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths.”151 The Court relied
on this explanation of religious liberty when allowing an immigrant
conscientious objector to military service to nonetheless become an
American citizen, citing both Ballard and Barnette for the Court’s understanding that the “struggle for religious liberty” had led to a “victory for freedom of thought recorded in our Bill of Rights” and “recognizes that in the domain of conscience there is a moral power higher
than the State.”152
To be sure, the Court’s post-Barnette decisions did not suggest that
religious parties must always win. For example, just a year after Barnette
the Court decided Prince v. Massachusetts, in which it held that the state
could make it illegal for children to engage in street preaching.153
148
149
150
151
152
153

See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 & n.10 (1944).
Id. at 665.
See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1415 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 68 (1946).
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
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Prince acknowledged Barnette’s protection for the free exercise rights
of children against the “preponderant” power of the state.154 But it
emphasized that this right was not without limits. Rather, the Court
could recognize the government’s strong interests in avoiding “the
crippling effects of child employment” and protecting them from
harm on the streets were sufficient to allow Massachusetts to outlaw
child street preaching, even though such activities could not be forbidden for adults.155
The triumph of Barnette, then, is not so much about religious
claimants always winning, but an approach to constitutional rights that
requires political actors to demonstrate to courts that they have very
strong reasons before restricting rights. This is the opposite of the
Thayer/Gobitis approach in which courts would only ask “whether legislators could in reason have enacted such a law” and would otherwise
defer.156
In some free exercise cases, this more protective Barnette approach
eventually took the shape of what we today would call “strict scrutiny.”157 In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court held that a burden on religious
exercise is only permissible if it is justified by a “compelling state interest.”158 The Court emphasized that Thayerian, Gobitis-style rational basis review had no place under the First Amendment: “It is basic that no
showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, ‘[o]nly the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for
permissible limitation.’”159

154 Id. at 165, 165–66 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
155 Id. at 168.
156 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 647 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter continued:
Therefore, in denying to the states what heretofore has received such impressive
judicial sanction, some other tests of unconstitutionality must surely be guiding
the Court than the absence of a rational justification for the legislation. But I know
of no other test which this Court is authorized to apply in nullifying legislation.
Id. at 666 (emphasis added).
157 There is a robust, ongoing debate over whether protection for fundamental rights
should be subject to tiers of scrutiny at all, or whether it should be absolute. See, e.g., Joel
Alicea & John D. Ohlendorf, Against the Tiers of Constitutional Scrutiny, 41 NAT’L AFFS. 72
(2019). That dispute is beyond the scope of this Article. For present purposes, it is enough
to recognize that whether protection is absolute or is subject to some judicial balancing as
under strict or intermediate scrutiny, all such systems fall on the Barnette side of the divide,
in that they impose actual, judicially-enforced limits beyond merely deferring to rational
legislative judgments as to constitutional rights.
158 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
159 Id. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
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The same day it decided Sherbert, the Court also invoked Barnette
in an Establishment Clause case rejecting a program of Bible reading
in public schools, noting that the “majority” could not “use the machinery of the State”160 to coerce because “fundamental rights may not
be submitted to [a] vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”161 This brought to fruition one of Justice Frankfurter’s fears
expressed in his Barnette dissent, namely that the abandonment of Gobitis-style thinking about the Bill of Rights would undermine Bible
reading in public schools.162
2. Barnette’s Broader Triumph in Constitutional Law
Barnette’s clear controlling status over Gobitis in Religion Clause
cases is mirrored by the treatment of Barnette in other areas of the law
as well. Even outside of the First Amendment context, Barnette is often
invoked as an important example of how judicial protection of constitutional rights is supposed to work.
For example, in the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court explains that it “is conventional
constitutional doctrine that where reasonable people disagree the government can adopt one position or the other.”163 But the opinion then
invokes Barnette as the example to demonstrate that this rule only applies in “a state of affairs in which the choice does not intrude upon a
protected liberty.”164 In other words, because the Court decided that
abortion was a constitutional right, it could not be regulated on Gobitis
terms (i.e., the legislative majority can choose, so long as its action satisfies a bare reasonableness standard), but instead on Barnette terms
that largely disable the majority from invading a protected right. The
Thayerian approach of only invalidating laws if they fail rational basis
does not apply to constitutional rights.
Likewise in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court relied heavily on Barnette’s understanding of the relationships between majority power and
fundamental rights in finding a right to same-sex marriage.165 The
Court explained that a plaintiff “can invoke a right to constitutional
160 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226, 225–26 (1963).
161 Id. at 226 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638). De’Siree Reeves argues persuasively,
based on original research into Justice Brennan’s papers, that the confluence of Sherbert
and Schempp on this issue was a result of Justice Brennan’s efforts to focus the Religion
Clauses on minority rights. See De’Siree N. Reeves, Missing Link: The Origin of Sherbert and
the Irony of Religious Equality, 15 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 236–48 (2019).
162 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 659 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
163 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
164 Id.
165 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015).
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protection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and even if the legislature refuses to act.”166 As support for this
view of rights, the Court relied on Barnette’s explanation that the idea
of the Bill of Rights was to place certain subjects beyond the reach of
popular majorities, so that they could be enforced by courts. The
Court quoted Barnette, stating: “[F]undamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”167
Of course, the constitutional holdings in Casey and Obergefell both
prompted vigorous dissenting opinions. But the dissenters were principally arguing about whether abortion and same-sex marriage qualify
as fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.168 No Justice, in
either case, challenged the assertions that a Barnette-style approach is
the proper course for protecting constitutional rights where there is a
constitutionally protected liberty interest. No Justice argued for the
deferential Thayer/Gobitis rule that laws can only be invalidated under
rational basis scrutiny even if there is a substantive constitutional right
at stake.
Casey and Obergefell thus demonstrate the largely undisputed triumph of the Barnette understanding of judicial protection of constitutional rights. Barnette—and not the Thayerian deference of Gobitis,
Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu—represents our standard constitutional approach to protecting rights. The point does not even prompt debate,
even in the most contentious cases.169

166 Id. at 677.
167 Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638).
168 See id. at 686 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 721
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Casey, 505 U.S. at 913 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 923 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part); id. at 951 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
169 Nor is this treatment of rights limited to the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, the
Court has emphasized in a variety of contexts that it views the Constitution as reflecting an
enforceable judgment or balancing of interests which legislatures and later courts are not
free to revise. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions
on the Government outweigh the costs.”); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635
(2008) (asserting that the Second Amendment “is the very product of an interest balancing
by the people” and not alterable by “future legislatures”); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 61 (2004) (noting that Confrontation Clause “reflects a judgment, not only about the
desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about
how reliability can best be determined”).
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3. Barnette’s Triumph in the Academy
Constitutional theorists have likewise had little difficulty concluding that the Barnette approach to judicial enforcement of rights—rather than the deferential Thayerian approach of Gobitis—controls.
This is hardly surprising, given that Barnette is “among the most renowned cases in American history,” and is considered “part of the essential fabric of American constitutional law.”170 While Gobitis is “well
known and widely excoriated amongst civil libertarians,”171 Barnette is
“celebrated” as a “hallmark[] of American liberty by both the left and
the right.”172 While Gobitis is denigrated as “arguably the worst Supreme Court majority opinion in a First Amendment case,” Barnette is
“almost universally regarded as one of the very best First Amendment
opinions ever produced.”173
This iconic status is attributable not only to its substantive outcome, but more broadly to its approach to minority rights in a pluralistic democracy. That is why Cass Sunstein, for example, recently wrote
that “[i]f we had to preserve just one Supreme Court opinion to show
some other civilization what American constitutional law is all about,”
he’d select Barnette because of how “foundational” it is in “help[ing]
orient large areas of the law.”174
Barnette can be Sunstein’s exemplar to show “what American constitutional law is all about” because Barnette’s approach to the judicial
enforcement of constitutional rights is so widely accepted as correct.
As Susan Estrich and Kathleen Sullivan have explained, Barnette’s
“‘withdrawal’ of fundamental liberties from the political arena is basic
to constitutional democracy as opposed to rank majoritarianism, and

170 William P. Marshall, Progressive Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the Significance of
Landmark Decisions in Evaluating Constitutional Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 1251 (2011);
see also David L. Hudson, Jr. & Jacob David Glenn, Fixed Stars: Famous First Amendment Phrases
and Their Indelible Impact, 15 CHARLESTON L. REV. 189, 190 (2020) (deeming Barnette’s
“fixed star” passage among “the most enduring passages in First Amendment jurisprudence”).
171 Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 325 (1992).
172 Marshall, supra note 170, at 1251.
173 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Unconscionable War on Moral Conscience, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1167, 1170–71 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT P. GEORGE, CONSCIENCE AND ITS
ENEMIES: CONFRONTING THE DOGMAS OF LIBERAL SECULARISM (2013)).
174 Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court’s Five Greatest Moments: Will June Bring the Next
Standout Ruling?, BLOOMBERG (June 1, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-06-01/the-supreme-court-s-five-greatest-moments
[https://perma.cc/E3RTDWN7].
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nowhere is such ‘withdrawal’ more important than in controversies
where moral convictions and passions run deepest.”175
To be sure, scholars have long wrestled with, and continue to debate, questions related to the legitimacy of judicial review.176 Much of
this scholarship has focused on what Alexander Bickel termed the
“Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty,” namely, the problem of how judicial
review could be legitimate in a majoritarian system.177 But that “difficulty” has seemed most acute in the context of judicial enforcement of
unwritten constitutional rights.
The countermajoritarian difficulty has turned out to be much less
difficult in the context at issue in Gobitis and Barnette, namely, where
positive law rights have been written into the Constitution. While judicial review may seem countermajoritarian when the Court is declaring or discovering new rights, it is markedly less so when the Court is
acting as it did in Barnette: simply enforcing the rights that the people
already chose to protect in the document. As Kurt Lash has explained,
in such cases the popular will expressed by protecting a right in the
Constitution itself “resolves the difficulty by grounding judicial review
in the more deeply democratic law of the people,” namely, the Constitution.178 This fact explains why John Hart Ely could observe in Democracy and Distrust that enforcement of positive law rights included in the
Constitution “seems to enjoy virtually universal contemporary acceptance.”179
Given this broad acceptance of judicially enforceable constitutional rights, it is not surprising that Richard Posner recently observed
175 Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of
One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 131 (1989) (“The inclusion of the free exercise clause attests
to this point.”). A Barnette-style approach to the judicial enforcement of the Constitution is
also behind, for example, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky’s argument that “the political process
cannot be relied on to comply voluntarily with the Constitution” so that “it is likely the
courts or nothing for enforcing and upholding the Constitution.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
WE THE PEOPLE: A PROGRESSIVE READING OF THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 20 (2018); see id. at 19 (“More generally, there is little incentive for the political
process to protect unpopular minorities, such as racial or political minorities.”).
176 See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 23; DWORKIN, supra note 40.
177 BICKEL, supra note 23, at 16 (“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a countermajoritarian force in our system.”); see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1980) (“[R]ule in accord with the consent of a majority of those
governed is the core of the American governmental system.”).
178 Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1437, 1446 (2007) (“Any legislative action that diverges from this higher law is an inferior expression of the people’s will and deserves invalidation.”).
179 ELY, supra note 177, at 8 (noting the argument that the Bill of Rights can be thought
of as a set of “side constraints” on majorities to prevent tyranny, and these constraints are
“more democratic” because they “have been imposed by the people themselves”).
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that “the ‘rational basis’ criterion of constitutionality, a legacy of
Thayer”—that is, the legal theory at the heart of Gobitis—“has dropped
away.”180 Everyone knows, it seems, that courts are supposed to protect
constitutional rights, and not merely defer to rational majoritarian decisions of the legislature.
III.

SMITH AS THE REVIVAL OF GOBITIS/THAYERIAN DEFERENCE

Given Barnette’s place in the constitutional pantheon—not just for
its broadly accepted outcome but as an exemplar of “what American
constitutional law is all about”—one would not expect courts to rely
on Gobitis and its deferential Thayerian approach to the Bill of Rights.
Why would anyone wish to return to what Justice Stone had called, in
his now-vindicated Gobitis dissent, the “surrender of the constitutional
protection of the liberty of small minorities to the popular will”?181
But there is one area of constitutional law in which the judicial
deference of Gobitis has retained significant lasting influence: religious
liberty. This is because, nearly fifty years after Gobitis was expressly overruled by Barnette, Gobitis received a very consequential revival in Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion in Employment Division v. Smith.
The Smith decision is of course most widely understood as a rejection or limitation on the idea of religious exemptions. But an important and underappreciated aspect of Smith is its approach to the
question of deference, and particularly its reembrace of the deferential
Gobitis view of the First Amendment.
A. Smith, Thayer, and Gobitis
Smith concerned a Native American man who was denied unemployment benefits because he was fired for ingesting peyote during a
religious ceremony.182 Although there was no criminal prosecution involved, the Supreme Court focused its decision on whether Oregon’s
criminal law was permitted “to include religiously inspired peyote use
within the reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that
drug.”183 Neither party had asked the Supreme Court to change the
180 Posner, supra note 24, at 534; see also Steven G. Calabresi, Originalism and James
Bradley Thayer, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1419, 1424–27 (2019) (noting the harmful effects of
Thayerian restraint, including in Plessy v. Ferguson, Debs v. United States, Buck v. Bell, Gobitis,
and Korematsu: “Suffice it to say that Thayerian restraint has unquestionably led to some
truly terrible case law”).
181 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 606 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting),
overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
182 See Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
183 Id. at 874.
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legal standards governing free exercise claims.184 Nor had the Court
granted certiorari to consider that issue. Accordingly, the question of
the proper standard for free exercise claims was neither briefed nor
addressed at oral argument.185
Just a few years earlier, the Court had explained why mere rational
basis was an inappropriate standard to apply to First Amendment religious liberty claims. First, the Court explained that deferring to the
legislature on a standard of bare reasonableness “has no basis in precedent.”186 Second, the Court stated that such deference “relegates a
serious First Amendment value to the barest level of minimal scrutiny
that the Equal Protection Clause already provides.”187
Nevertheless, without prompting by the parties, Smith contains a
lengthy discussion of what legal standard should apply where a party’s
exercise of religion conflicts with a general law enacted by the majority.
Smith established a new standard for many such cases: So long as the
government is applying a “neutral” and “generally applicable” law, the
First Amendment provides no heightened protection.188 Instead, the
Court would only apply deferential, rational basis review. The Court
embraced this standard in large part to avoid the prospect of judges

184 As Justice Souter explained in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 571–72 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), Smith was decided without “full-dress argument” on whether strict scrutiny or rational basis should apply. Instead, the parties—including the State of Oregon—had treated
the strict scrutiny rule as part of the “settled free exercise principles” controlling the case.
Id. (“[N]either party squarely addressed the proposition the Court was to embrace, that the
Free Exercise Clause was irrelevant to the dispute.”).
185 Relying in part on Justice Blackmun’s papers, Nathan Lewin has recently argued
that the process by which the Court decided Smith actually runs afoul of the “principle of
party presentation” the Supreme Court has unanimously endorsed in United States v.
Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020). See Nathan Lewin, Did the Supreme Court Forget How
It Curtailed Religious Freedom 30 Years Ago?, NEWSWEEK (May 14, 2020) (quoting SinenengSmith, 140 S. Ct. at 1577), https://www.newsweek.com/did-supreme-court-forget-how-itcurtailed-religious-freedom-30-years-ago-opinion-1503497
[https://perma.cc/LH3UAPYC].
186 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n., 480 U.S. 136, 141, 141–42 (1987)
(quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 727 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
187 Id. at 141–42 (quoting Roy, 476 U.S. at 727 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)). In her opinion in Roy, Justice O’Connor had reviewed the cases and
concluded that they demonstrated that “[o]nly an especially important governmental interest pursued by narrowly tailored means can justify exacting a sacrifice of First Amendment freedoms as the price for an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed
by other citizens.” Roy, 476 U.S. at 728 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). As the Court pointed out in Hobbie, five Justices in Roy shared Justice O’Connor’s
views on this point. See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141.
188 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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deciding whether society’s interests justified imposing the burdens.189
The Court argued that, precisely because of the nation’s religious diversity and pluralism, holding the government to the Sherbert compelling interest standard “would be courting anarchy.”190
Smith reflects the Thayerian judicial deference approach in several
important ways. First, Smith, like Gobitis, established a rule that will frequently allow laws enacted by the majority to restrict the minority’s exercise of religion. So long as the law is “neutral [and] generally applicable”191 (Smith’s framing) or “not directed against doctrinal loyalties
of particular sects”192 (Gobitis’s framing), the cases suggested no special
scrutiny would apply, and all rational laws would be upheld. In this
regard, Smith joined Gobitis in adopting the Thayer/Hand approach
that, even for rights protected by the Bill of Rights, courts should defer
to rational legislative judgments.
Second, both cases therefore leave only a very limited role for
judges in the protection of constitutional rights. Both cases insist that
it is usually the job of the legislature, rather than the courts, to protect
the minority. Thus, like Gobitis, Smith leaves minorities at the mercy of
democratic majorities for their rights. Smith found that the “relative
disadvantage” minorities experience in the political process is an “unavoidable consequence of democratic government” that “must be preferred” to judicial balancing.193 In Thayer’s terms, deference to the
legislature is required so that a court does not become “a board for
answering legislative conundrums.”194
Finally, both cases emphasized that an alternative rule—one in
which judges apply constitutional scrutiny to determine whether the
government can force someone to violate his or her religion—would
undermine pluralism and suggest that “conscience has itself no limits”195 (Gobitis) or that protecting conscience would “court[] anarchy”196 (Smith).
These parallels between Smith and Gobitis are no accident. To the
contrary, they are the result of Smith’s direct reliance on Gobitis. In
particular, Smith relied on Gobitis—rather than Barnette—as authority
for how religious liberty claims should be decided. Quoting Gobitis,

189 See id. at 890.
190 Id. at 888.
191 Id. at 881.
192 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
193 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
194 Thayer, supra note 5, at 146.
195 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594.
196 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
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the Smith Court explained that “mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does
not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities.”197 The Court then further cited Gobitis as an example of the principle that courts will not provide religious exemptions from neutral
and generally applicable laws.198 Curiously, Smith did not even note
that Gobitis had been overruled.199
Despite Justice Scalia’s general embrace of originalism, the Smith
decision was not driven by any argument about the original public
meaning of the text of the Free Exercise Clause. When arguing that
the clause should not lead to religious exemptions, the most the Court
says about the text or originalism is that “we do not think the words
must be given that meaning.”200 The Court then suggested that its own
reading of the text was at least “permissible.”201 The Court’s textual
ambivalence was buttressed, however, with its more firmly stated view
about what its own “decisions reveal” about the best interpretation.202
Those decisions—most prominently Gobitis—led the Court to conclude that application of strict judicial scrutiny would supplant legislative decisionmaking and create anarchy.203 Thus while Smith was somewhat ambivalent about text, it was quite adamant about judicial role
and the likely practical consequences of taking a more protective view
of religious liberty.204
Concurring only in the judgment, Justice O’Connor explained
why she could not endorse the Court’s Thayerian, Gobitis-inspired reasoning. Writing for herself and the three dissenters (Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun), Justice O’Connor noted that “the First
Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those whose
religious practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed
with hostility.”205 Citing Barnette as overruling Gobitis, Justice O’Connor explained that “[t]he history of our free exercise doctrine amply
demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and
the Amish.”206 Rejecting the rational basis approach embraced by

197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

Id. at 879 (quoting Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594–95).
See id.
See id.
Id. at 878.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 87888.
See id. at 888–90.
Id. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id.
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Gobitis and now Smith, Justice O’Connor argued that “[t]he compelling
interest test reflects the First Amendment’s mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society” and
that the Smith/Gobitis approach of mere rational basis review “denigrate[d] ‘[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights.’”207
The three dissenters likewise rejected the notion that the Religion
Clauses allowed the courts to accept “the repression of minority religions” as an “unavoidable consequence of democratic government.”208
To the contrary, echoing Barnette, they asserted that judicial protection
for minority religious beliefs and practices was “an essential element
of liberty” and that the Founders had “drafted the Religion Clauses
precisely in order to avoid” such intolerance.209
B. Smith’s Aftermath
Smith provoked a strong reaction.210 Scholars, activists, and lawmakers from across the political spectrum and from a broad range of
religious groups came together to enact heightened protections for religious liberty in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).211
That story has already been well chronicled elsewhere.212
For present purposes, it is enough to note that, by enacting the
RFRA, Congress sought to reimpose the compelling interest test that
Smith had jettisoned.213 While the Supreme Court had downgraded
many free exercise claims to mere rational basis review, Congress
thought that strict scrutiny “is a workable test” which helps strike “sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.”214 But the Supreme Court soon found that Congress
could not reimpose those tests as a constitutional matter, and thus held
RFRA inapplicable to state and local governments.215 Otherwise, the
Court held that RFRA could impose the compelling interest test as a

207 Id. at 903, 902–03 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943)).
208 Id. at 909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 890 (majority opinion)).
209 Id.
210 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1
(“Anger at the result was compounded by anger at the procedure. The Court sharply
changed existing law without an opportunity for briefing or argument, and it issued an
opinion claiming that its new rules had been the law for a hundred years.”).
211 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2018).
212 See generally Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209 (1994).
213 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2018).
214 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2018).
215 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
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statutory matter against the federal government,216 and that a successor
statute to RFRA, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA),217 could do the same for prison and land-use cases at
the state and local levels.218 In addition, many states interpreted their
own state constitutions to follow the Sherbert compelling interest approach rather than the Smith rational basis approach.219 Others
adopted state-level RFRA statutes.220
These post-Smith changes had two principal effects that are relevant to our discussion. First, because so many religious liberty claims
were controlled by other sources of law, the Supreme Court would go
more than twenty years after Smith without having to even consider applying Smith’s rational basis rule to a neutral and generally applicable
statute. Federal cases were decided under RFRA221 and RLUIPA,222 or
involved statutes that fell outside of Smith’s rule because they obviously
lacked neutrality and general applicability.223 Litigators brought far

216 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424
(2006).
217 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2018).
218 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005).
219 See generally Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State
RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 467 (2010) [hereinafter Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales];
Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163,
169 (2016) [hereinafter Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities].
220 See generally Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales, supra note 219, at 467; Lund,
RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, supra note 219, at 164.
221 See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 424.
222 See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 714.
223 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993).
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fewer free exercise claims,224 and many such claims could be resolved
under state statutes and constitutions that applied the pre-Smith rule.225
Second, the vast expansion of subconstitutional protections (both
the federal statutes and the state constitutions and state statutes) provided an opportunity for courts across the country, and occasionally
the Supreme Court itself, to engage in precisely the judicial balancing
that Smith and Gobitis feared would lead to anarchy, and that Thayer
feared was a separation-of-powers problem. As will be discussed in
more detail in the next Part, this has allowed courts to demonstrate
both their ability to apply the compelling interest test and that the results of the test do not appear to produce the feared problems.226
IV.

REJECTING DEFERENCE: 2012–PRESENT AT THE SUPREME COURT

Since 2012, the Supreme Court has decided a series of religious
liberty cases, touching virtually every aspect of religious liberty law.
These cases have concerned religious exercises by members of a wide
224 See Douglas Laycock, Comment, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and
Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 201 &
n.281 (2004) (“Filing rates for free exercise claims plummeted after Smith, and these claims
had lower success rates than the larger number of claims decided before Smith.” (footnote
omitted) (citing Amy Adamczyk, John Wybraniec & Roger Finke, Religious Regulation and
the Courts: Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA, 46 J. CHURCH & STATE 237, 250 tbl.1
(2004), as “reporting 310 claims decided in the nine-and-a-quarter years before Smith, compared to thirty-eight claims decided in three-and-a-half years after Smith”)).
One minor exception is that the Court did briefly address a free exercise claim in
a footnote in Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the
Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 697 n.27 (2010). Martinez concerned whether a Christian
student group at a public law school should be permitted to restrict its leadership to Christians who shared the group’s beliefs. See id. at 669–73. In a testament to the power of Smith,
the Christian group had downplayed its free exercise claim so much that the Court could
dispose of it in a footnote explaining that Smith protects “otherwise valid” restrictions from
attack. Id. at 697 n.27.
225 To be sure, the mere fact that these cases could be decided under state RFRAs did
not guarantee success—many such claims failed. See Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales,
supra note 219, at 467.
226 See Mark L. Rienzi, The Case for Religious Exemptions—Whether Religion Is Special or
Not, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1395, 1411 (2014) (reviewing BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY
(2013)) (“The problem with this argument is that we have now had enough experience
under religious exemption regimes to know that they do not create anarchy. For example,
we have lived under a religious exemption regime at the federal level for more than twenty
years. And roughly half of all states apply similar regimes based on either state court decisions or state statutes resembling the federal regime. No serious claim can be made that
these systems have produced anarchy, or anything close to it. Indeed, it is far more likely
that none of us even notices when we travel from an exemption state to a nonexemption
state and back.” (footnotes omitted)).
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variety of faith groups (Muslims,227 Lutherans,228 Jews,229 Catholics,230
and Wiccans,231 among others). They have involved a wide variety of
types of religious liberty claims (church autonomy,232 Free Exercise
Clause,233 Establishment Clause,234 and federal statutes)235 and a wide
variety of factual contexts (schools,236 nursing homes,237 prisons,238
Abercrombie & Fitch stores,239 town meetings,240 war memorials,241 and
more). In virtually all of them, the Court has ruled in favor of the
religious party, practice, or monument.
Scholars and critics have offered a variety of theories about these
cases. Some have argued that the Court is engaged in the process of
interpreting the religion clauses to favor conservative and Christian
causes. For example, Dean Chemerinsky and Professor Gillman argue
that recent cases show the clauses “being interpreted to allow powerful
religious groups to harm innocent third parties and to establish a privileged status within the political system, to the detriment of true religious liberty and diversity.”242 Others argue that the Court is engaged
in an “unusual dialogue” with the “religious right” to forge a “new

227 See, e.g., Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 489 (2020); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch
Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 770 (2015); Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 355–56 (2015).
228 See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017
(2017); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 177–
80 (2012).
229 See, e.g., Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 889 (2020) (mem.).
230 See Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct.
2367, 2375 (2020); Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055
(2020).
231 See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 572 (2014).
232 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 180; Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2055.
233 See, e.g., Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2251 (2020); Trinity
Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017.
234 See, e.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019); Town of
Greece, 572 U.S. at 572.
235 See, e.g., Little Sisters, 140 S. Ct. at 2373; Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. 403, 406–07
(2016); Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356 (2015); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573
U.S. 682, 691 (2014).
236 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 178–79.
237 See, e.g., Little Sisters, 140 S. Ct. at 2375.
238 See, e.g., Hobbs, 574 U.S. at 355–56.
239 See, e.g., EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 770 (2015).
240 See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 569–70 (2014).
241 See, e.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019).
242 Erwin Chemerinsky & Howard Gillman, Symposium: The Unfolding Revolution in the
Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 6, 2020, 10:36 AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/08/symposium-the-unfolding-revolution-in-the-jurisprudence-of-the-religion-clauses/ [https://perma.cc/A563-RSS7].
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church-state landscape,”243 and to do so in a way that is “bad for civil
rights, especially for rights of women, LGBTQ individuals and people
of color.”244
These theories fail to account for the sheer variety of different
parties the Court has ruled for (many are women, many non-Christian,
and many are racial minorities). And they fail to account for the often
supermajority support for the winning parties. That supermajority support has often included Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, Sotomayor, and
Breyer—unlikely coconspirators in forging a new conservative Christian monopoly on religious liberty to hurt minority rights.
The better explanation for the Court’s recent religious liberty decisions is that a broad cross-section of the Court is fully embracing a
Barnette-style approach to religious liberty, in which the First Amendment provides strong, judicially enforceable protections for religious
minorities and religious pluralism. These decisions firmly reject every
aspect of the deferential Thayerian approach to constitutional rights
used in Gobitis—its view of judicial role, its deference to merely rational
legislative choices, and its fear that judicially enforceable rights are irreconcilable with ordered liberty. The Court has thus emphatically
demonstrated that it views the religion clauses as important and enforceable protectors of religious liberty and peaceful pluralism.245
This Part will discuss how a rejection of deference explains the
Court’s decisions across four different groups of religious liberty cases:
church autonomy, free exercise, Establishment Clause, and statutory
rights.

243 Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Religious Crusaders at the Supreme Court’s Gates, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/opinion/supreme-courtreligion.html [https://perma.cc/HW9D-G3ZL].
244 Leslie Griffin, Symposium: Religions’ Wins Are Losses, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 4, 2020,
1:43 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/08/symposium-religions-wins-are-losses/
[https://perma.cc/4RAG-SFUW].
245 To be sure, the claim here is not that the Court has only recently discovered the
notion that the First Amendment in general, and the religion clauses in particular, serve
the cause of pluralism. Barnette’s poetic language about “[t]he very purpose of a Bill of
Rights” makes clear that accommodation of differences has long been understood as a critical aspect of the First Amendment. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
638 (1943); see also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1952) (noting that accommodation “follows the best of our traditions”). My point here is simply that, over the past
decade, the Justices have put particular emphasis on the work the religion clauses do to
protect pluralism, and that they could not do that work with only a narrow, deferential
approach to free exercise as seen in Gobitis or Smith.
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A. Church Autonomy Cases
The Court’s modern path toward rejecting judicial deference began in earnest in 2012 with Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
& School v.EEOC.246 Hosanna-Tabor concerned a fourth-grade teacher
who had been fired by a Lutheran elementary school.247 The teacher
claimed she had been fired in violation of a general law duly enacted
by the legislative majority: the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).248
The school claimed a First Amendment right to terminate the teacher
for religious reasons, regardless of the ADA.249 The case thus required
the Court to determine whether the First Amendment’s protections
for religious autonomy could trump the requirements imposed by a
general and majority-supported law.
Had Hosanna-Tabor been decided under the deferential
Thayer/Hand/Gobitis approach, it would have been an easy case. The
Americans with Disabilities Act is a broad and general law, duly enacted
by a legislative majority.250 The ADA is not “directed against [the] doctrinal loyalties”251 of any particular group, but instead reflects an obviously rational majoritarian conclusion that people should not be fired
for having disabilities.252 Under a Gobitis or Smith approach, the Court
would have deferred to the legislature—even if that harmed a group
with minority beliefs or practices—so long as the Court decided that
the law was rationally pursuing a legitimate goal.253 And if the legislature had not seen fit to create an exemption for religious schools hiring elementary school teachers, that would have been the end of the
analysis. Indeed, the Court may well have just repeated its hands-off
lines from Gobitis that judicial interference with such a legislative decision would “amount to no less than the pronouncement of pedagogical and psychological dogma in a field where courts possess no marked
and certainly no controlling competence.”254

246 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
247 See id. at 178–79.
248 See id. at 179.
249 See id. at 180.
250 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018).
251 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
252 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2018).
253 See Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 597–98 (where “the end is legitimate” the court will not “stigmatize legislative judgment” about how to achieve it). In his Barnette dissent, Justice Frankfurter defended the Gobitis approach and explained that the Court should only focus on
“whether legislators could in reason have enacted such a law.” Barnette, 319 U.S. at 647
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
254 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 597–98.
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In briefing to the Supreme Court, no party expressly embraced or
endorsed Gobitis itself. However, the United States government asked
the Court to apply Smith’s Gobitis-inspired rule and find no special constitutional protection for religious minorities in the face of a general
statute enacted by the majority. In particular, the government argued
that the ADA is “generally applicable” in that it “applies to all employers with more than 15 employees,” that it does not “single out” religious groups for disfavor, and that the school therefore “cannot claim
that the Free Exercise Clause provides it an exemption from the ADA’s
generally applicable prohibition on retaliation.”255
Not a single Justice accepted this argument. Instead, the Court
unanimously held that the religion clauses of the First Amendment
control, even in the face of a general legislative enactment like the
ADA. The Court found the government’s position “untenable,” “remarkable,” and “hard to square with the text of the First Amendment
itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.”256 The Court refused to apply Smith’s rational basis rule to what
it deemed “an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”257
This was not because the Court found the interests advanced by
the ADA to be weaker than the majority’s interest in promoting nationalism in Gobitis, or its interest in enforcing drug laws in Smith. Rather,
the Court acknowledged that the interest in enforcing employment
discrimination laws was not merely legitimate or rational, but “undoubtedly important.”258 But the Court refused to defer to the majoritarian legislative process about how to balance that interest against the
interest of religious groups in choosing who they will work with to
teach their faith and carry out their mission. To the contrary, invoking
both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, all nine
Justices agreed that “the First Amendment has struck the balance for
us” and requires an exemption for the school.259 This is the opposite
of the deference approach taken in Gobitis and Smith. It is the opposite
of the approach recommended by Thayer and is observable in cases
like Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu.

255 Brief for the Federal Respondent at 22, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (No. 10-553).
256 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189
(2012).
257 Id. at 190.
258 Id. at 196.
259 Id. at 184, 196.
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Eight years later, the Court built on its Hosanna-Tabor decision in
Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru.260 Our Lady again concerned the ministerial exception rooted in both religion clauses.261 A
7 –2 majority ruled that nondiscrimination laws like the Americans
with Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
cannot constrain the freedom of religious groups to choose the teachers who will pass on the faith to children.262 This is true even if the
school does not rely on an overtly religious reason for its employment
decision, and if the teacher lacks a religious-sounding title or special
religious training.263 Rather “[w]hat matters, at bottom, is what an employee does.”264 If the employee has religiously important duties like
teaching the faith, then the government cannot interfere in the employment decision, even if the employee also has many other secular
duties.265 The Constitution protects religious autonomy, even if the
group’s values do not conform to those of the governing majority.
Again, the Court refused to simply defer to even broadly supported
general laws.
Dissenting, Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg did not seem to disagree about many of the key religious liberty points. They acknowledged the ministerial exception as “extraordinarily potent” and reaffirmed their support of the Court’s 9–0 endorsement of the ministerial
exception in Hosanna-Tabor.266 Their disagreement concerned not so
much the law but what they called “disputed facts” in a “context-specific” analysis.267 Thus, the opinions in Our Lady show all nine Justices
recognizing the importance of allowing religious groups to make employment decisions in accordance with their beliefs, even when those
decisions implicate weighty societal interests like nondiscrimination.
The broad agreement among the Justices that the Constitution
creates judicially enforceable church autonomy rights is important and
reminiscent of Barnette. All nine Justices appear to accept the premise
that the First Amendment protects religious liberty, and that courts
cannot simply defer even to important and obviously rational statutes
like Title VII. Rather than just defer to the legislature’s rational decisionmaking (the approach of Gobitis, Smith, Thayer, and Hand), the

260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267

Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
See id. at 2060.
See id. at 2069.
See id. at 2063–64, 2068.
Id. at 2064.
See id.
Id. at 2072 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2073, 2075.
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Justices instead treated the religion clauses as strong, judicially enforceable protections for religious groups.
B. Free Exercise Cases
The church autonomy cases above were decided based on the full
breadth of the religion clauses, taking into account both free exercise
and establishment principles. Similar developments have occurred,
however, even in cases decided solely on free exercise grounds. Three
groups of free exercise cases stand out: marriage, Blaine Amendments,
and COVID-19 lockdowns.
1. Marriage
The Court’s discussion of free exercise rights in the context of
same-sex marriage reflects a Barnette approach to the enforcement and
role of the First Amendment. This has occurred in a range of cases,
some of which are directly about religious liberty (Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission268 and Fulton v. City of Philadelphia)269 and some of which only address religious questions in passing
(Obergefell v. Hodges270 and Bostock v. Clayton County).271
First, the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop addressed whether the Free
Exercise Clause provided protection for a religious baker who objected
to being forced to create a cake for a same-sex wedding.272 A sevenJustice majority ruled in favor of the baker, finding that the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission had demonstrated “religious hostility” and
had therefore failed to provide “the religious neutrality that the Constitution requires.”273
To be sure, this resolution is, in one sense, technically reconcilable with the Gobitis/Smith approach to rights. One can think of Colorado’s action as “directed against doctrinal loyalties”274 (Gobitis’s framing) or not “neutral”275 (Smith’s framing) toward the baker’s religious
beliefs. If that were all the opinion said, Masterpiece Cakeshop might be
a counterexample in our discussion.

268 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
269 Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
270 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
271 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
272 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.
273 Id. at 1724.
274 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
275 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
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But Masterpiece Cakeshop also discussed the reach of the Free Exercise Clause in ways that suggest it is far more protective than Gobitis or
Smith would seem to allow. First, the seven Justices in the majority explained that the case concerned the baker’s “right . . . to exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment.”276 Both Smith and
Gobitis had argued that the scope of the Free Exercise Clause did not
include a right to exemption from general laws; Masterpiece Cakeshop’s
classification of the baker’s actions as exercise of a “fundamental freedom under the First Amendment” is far more generous.
Second, the majority gave a specific example that is difficult to
reconcile with the deferential Gobitis/Smith approach: exemptions for
clergy who refuse to perform same-sex marriages. The Court explained: “When it comes to weddings, it can be assumed that a member
of the clergy who objects to gay marriage on moral and religious
grounds could not be compelled to perform the ceremony without denial of his or her right to the free exercise of religion.”277
The Court’s assumption—joined by seven Justices—reflects a Barnette approach in that it recognizes important substantive protections
from the First Amendment that cannot be overridden with a mere rational basis. Under a Gobitis or Smith approach, one might think a sufficiently neutral and general requirement to perform weddings (say, a
requirement that all persons licensed by the state to perform weddings
must not discriminate) could force clergy to perform. Yet the Court
instead treats the Free Exercise Clause as providing important, judicially enforceable protections, even against such laws.
The
Thayer/Hand approach of deferring, even in Bill of Rights cases, to
nonirrational laws is nowhere to be found.278
The Masterpiece Cakeshop holding is also consistent with the Court’s
discussion of religious freedom in its Obergefell decision. As noted
above, Obergefell relied on the Barnette understanding of judicially enforceable minority rights in finding a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage.279 And although Obergefell was not a First Amendment case,
it discussed the religious opposition to same-sex marriage in terms that
suggest strong First Amendment protection—much stronger than
would be allowed under the deference approach.
For example, Obergefell explained that the constitutional problem
in that case arose not simply because people held “decent and
276 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.
277 Id. at 1727.
278 Indeed, it appears that all nine Justices may have agreed with this principle, as the
two dissenters did not take issue with the majority’s statement about clergy. See id. at 1748
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
279 See supra text accompanying notes 165–67.
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honorable religious or philosophical” objections to same-sex marriage.280 The constitutional problem arose only when one particular
view of marriage became “enacted law and public policy” in a way that
“put the imprimatur of the State itself” on a view of marriage that “demeans or stigmatizes” those left out.281 The law should not make
“[o]utlaw[s]” or even “outcast[s]” of those living out a contrary view
of marriage.282
The Obergefell Court went on to emphasize the importance of First
Amendment rights in protecting people and organizations who held a
traditional view of marriage. First, the Court stressed that its decision
should not be taken to “disparage[]” those with contrary religious
views.283 Second, it emphasized that “[t]he First Amendment ensures
that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection
as they seek to teach the principles . . . [and] continue the family structure” they have so long revered.”284
Viewed through the lens of Obergefell, Masterpiece Cakeshop can be
understood as the Court’s initial delivery on Obergefell’s earlier promise
that the First Amendment would provide protection for religious dissenters on marriage. Taken together, the cases demonstrate the
Court’s faith that a strong First Amendment is an important and enforceable part of helping people of vastly different beliefs live together
in peace. That is a role the First Amendment could not play under a
deferential Gobitis/Smith approach to rights. But it fits perfectly with a
Barnette approach.
Secondly, although it was not a religious liberty case, the Court’s
Title VII decision in Bostock v. Clayton County similarly embraced a
strong Free Exercise doctrine that appears irreconcilable with a Gobitis/Smith approach of Thayerian deference.285 In Bostock, the Court
found that Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination included discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, including against
employees in same-sex marriages.286 In the course of its opinion, the
Court explained that religious employers would not need to be forced
to violate their religion.287 This is because the guarantee of free exercise “lies at the heart of our pluralistic society.”288 No one could ever

280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 672 (2015).
Id.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 679–80.
See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
See id. at 1742, 1754.
See id. at 1754.
Id.
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have called the view of the First Amendment depicted in Gobitis “the
heart of our pluralistic society.”
Finally, last Term in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, the Court decided in favor of foster parents and their religious foster agency that
would not perform foster care certifications for same-sex couples.289
The Justices voiced a range of views about Smith itself—with three voting to reverse Smith as incompatible with the First Amendment (Justices Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch),290 three openly musing about how
best to replace Smith (Justices Barrett, Kavanaugh, and Breyer),291 and
three finding that the Smith questions need not be reached at all (Chief
Justice Roberts, and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor).292 But all nine
Justices agreed that the religious parties in Fulton should win, and even
the Justices who did not openly call for Smith’s reversal gave the decision an interpretation that vastly minimizes the range of cases in which
the Smith/Gobitis rule of deference to rational decisions would control.293
Fulton, in fact, sets forth three different categories of free exercise
cases that trigger strict scrutiny and thereby avoid Smith’s deferential
rule. First, the Court reiterated its Masterpiece Cakeshop holding that
strict scrutiny would apply where government actors “proceed[] in a
manner intolerant of religious beliefs” or “restrict[] practices because
of their religious nature.”294 Although the Fulton Court found it “more
straightforward” to resolve the case under general applicability, Fulton’s invocation of the Masterpiece Cakeshop path to avoiding deference
is significant because some lower courts had previously read the decision as only applying to discrimination by “adjudicatory bodies” rather
than the rest of government.295
Second, the Court explained that strict scrutiny applies where the
government “permit[s] secular conduct that undermines the government’s asserted interests in a similar way” to proposed religious

289 See Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1873 (2021).
290 See id. at 1924 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Smith was wrongly decided.”).
291 See id. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring) (“We need not wrestle with these questions
in this case, though, because the same standard applies regardless whether Smith stays or
goes.”).
292 See id. at 1881 (majority opinion) (“Because the City’s actions are therefore examined under the strictest scrutiny regardless of Smith, we have no occasion to reconsider that
decision here.”).
293 See id. at 1882.
294 Id. at 1877.
295 Id.; see, e.g., State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1218 (Wash. 2019), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 2884 (2021).
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conduct.296 Thus, even if the legislature makes rational distinctions,
Fulton makes clear that the Court often will not defer to them.
Third, and most importantly for Fulton itself, the Court found that
strict scrutiny applies—and therefore the courts cannot simply defer—
where a law invites the government to “consider the particular reasons
for a person’s conduct” by providing “a mechanism for individualized
exemptions.”297 The Court found that Philadelphia’s foster-care system failed this test because the City retained the ability to grant waivers
but would not grant one for the religious agency, thus triggering strict
scrutiny.298
To be sure, Fulton also included considerable discussion about
whether the Court should reconsider Smith. Justice Barrett and Justice
Kavanaugh openly wondered why the Free Exercise Clause “lone
among the First Amendment freedoms” should offer so little protection, and Justice Breyer joined them in noting the range of issues the
Court would need to confront to move beyond Smith.299 Justice Alito,
joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, argued that Smith’s “severe
holding” was “ripe for reexamination.”300 Yet, even without overruling
Smith, the Court has at least circumscribed the sphere in which Smith’s
rule applies, explaining several different paths to avoiding Smith’s
Thayerian deference.
2. State Funding Cases
The Court has also recently applied the Free Exercise Clause in a
trio of cases concerning limitations in state funding laws that exclude
religious groups. These laws are sometimes known as “Blaine Amendments” due to similar restrictions that developed in the nineteenth
century as a result of anti-Catholic bigotry and were included in many

296 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877.
297 Id. (quoting Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)).
298 See id. at 1878. The Court further found that home certifications involve “a customized and selective assessment” and a “sensitive process” that agencies “understandably
approach” from “different angles.” Id. at 1880.
299 Id. at 1881 (Barrett, J., concurring); see id. at 1882–83.
300 Id. at 1883 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Alito feared that the
Court’s decision could “vanish” leaving the parties “back where they started” if Philadelphia
simply eliminated the contract’s waiver provision. Id. at 1887. On remand, however, Philadelphia conceded defeat under the Free Exercise Clause and has since resumed working
with Catholic Social Services. See Julia Terruso, Philadelphia Reaches $2 Million Settlement with
Catholic Foster-Care Agency, Aiming to Prevent Future Challenges to LGBTQ Rights, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 22, 2021), https://www.inquirer.com/news/foster-care-philadelphia-catholic-church-lgbtq-settlement-supreme-court-20211122.html
[https://perma.cc/V954PWKZ].
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state constitutions.301 Three recent cases required the Court to consider the impact of the Free Exercise Clause on such laws.
First, in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, a broad
7–2 majority found that Missouri had violated the Free Exercise Clause
by excluding religious nonprofits from participating in a generally
available government program.302 Missouri had excluded a Lutheran
preschool from participating in a state-run program to provide nonprofits with funds for rubberized playground surfaces made from recycled tire scraps.303
In defending its exclusion, Missouri echoed Gobitis in arguing that
its policy should only be invalidated if it failed rational basis review. 304
Missouri relied heavily on Smith, arguing that under Smith, courts
should simply allow religious groups to “drive policy through the political process” rather than giving them special constitutional protection.305 Because Smith had relegated religious groups to the legislative
process, Missouri said the Supreme Court should do the same in Trinity
Lutheran.
The Court refused. Instead, seven Justices rejected the appeal to
Smith as controlling. First, the Court relied on Hosanna-Tabor as showing that Smith’s rule does not necessarily mean that “any application of
a valid and neutral law of general applicability is necessarily constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause.”306 Second, the Court found
that Smith’s rule did not exclude judicial protection where a party’s
“religious status” resulted in “special disabilities,” a principle the
Court drew not only from Smith but from both Establishment and Free
Exercise Clause cases.307 Where the government has violated this rule,
its actions are subject not to mere rational basis, but to “the most exacting scrutiny.”308
None of this is consistent with a Gobitis approach to constitutional
rights, or with the Thayer/Hand approach of deferring to rational
301 See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2259 (2020) (noting that
Blaine Amendments were “born of bigotry” and carry a “shameful pedigree” (quoting
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000) (plurality opinion))).
302 See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025
(2017).
303 See id. at 2017.
304 See Brief of Respondent at 4, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,
137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (No. 15-577).
305 See id. at 37, 37–39.
306 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2021 n.2.
307 Id. at 2019, 2019–20 (first quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 542 (1993); then citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628
(1978); and then citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67 (1947)).
308 Id. at 2021 (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546).
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legislative choices. The Court was not willing to merely defer to the
legislative choices of the majority and was not willing to apply mere
rational basis review. Instead, the Constitution functioned as a serious
check on majority power. Even if the harm to the religious party was
likely only “a few extra scraped knees,” such discrimination was “odious to our Constitution all the same, and cannot stand.”309
The Court reached a similar result in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, where it rejected a Montana state constitutional provision that excluded religious schools from participating in public programs.310 The Court rejected Blaine Amendments as “born of bigotry”
and having a “shameful pedigree,” leading to discrimination that is
“condemn[ed]” by the First Amendment.311 The Court applied strict
scrutiny to find Montana’s exclusion of religious schools invalid under
the Free Exercise Clause.312
In 2022, the Court extended this rationale in Carson v. Makin,
again rejecting a provision barring public funds for private schools
solely because the schools are religious.313 Maine argued its program
was distinct from the one in Espinoza on the grounds that (1) Maine’s
tuition assistance program was designed to stand in as a substitute to
traditional public schooling and (2) Maine’s restrictions on religious
schools was “use-based” rather than “status-based.”314 The Court rejected both arguments. Even if Maine’s political branches wanted to
exclude religious schools, the state still was not free to violate “free
exercise principles governing any such public benefit program.”315
Furthermore, the Court held that a status versus use distinction is no
“less offensive to the Free Exercise Clause.”316
In one sense, it is possible to view Trinity Lutheran, Espinoza, and
Carson as somewhat reconcilable with Smith because the laws at issue
are not “neutral” toward religion. Still, the decisions are far more in
line with the nondeferential vision of the First Amendment set forth in
Barnette rather than Gobitis and Smith. Trinity Lutheran, Espinoza, and
Carson all treat the First Amendment as a legal principle to be enforced
by courts, which cannot simply defer to rational legislative judgments.
None suggests that there is “no other test which this Court is

309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316

Id. at 2025, 2024–25.
See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2262 (2020).
Id. at 2259, 2262.
Id. at 2260.
Carson v. Makin, 142 S. Ct. 1987, 2002 (2022).
See id. at 1998.
Id. at 2000.
Id. at 2001.
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authorized to apply” than rational basis, as asserted by Justice Frankfurter.317 None seems willing to accept condemning religious minorities to a “relative disadvantage” in their religious exercise as the “unavoidable consequence of democratic government”—namely majoritarian control—that “must be preferred” to judicially created exemptions.318 To the contrary, these cases treat majority-imposed restrictions on religious character—even for entities that are seeking to
participate in public funding programs—as “odious to our Constitution.”319
3. COVID-19 Lockdowns
Over the past two years, the Court has also had occasion to consider the Free Exercise Clause in a series of cases concerning COVID19 lockdowns. Many lower courts had upheld limits on religious worship gatherings in reliance on the deferential standards set forth in
both Smith and Jacobson v. Massachusetts.320 On an emergency application by Catholic and Jewish houses of worship, however, the Court issued a per curiam opinion in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo
granting relief against New York’s limits on indoor worship gatherings.321 While many other activities in New York had been subject to
percentage-based occupancy limits—which meant that larger buildings could accommodate more people—the State had limited gatherings for religious worship to only ten or twenty-five people in certain
zones, regardless of the size of the building.322
The lower courts, in reliance on Smith and Jacobson and in light of
the public health emergency posed by COVID-19, had upheld the restrictions using only rational basis review.323 The Supreme Court, however, applied strict scrutiny because it found the restrictions were not
neutral and generally applicable.324 It found that New York’s
317 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 666 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
318 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
319 Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2255 (2020) (quoting Trinity
Lutheran Church of Colombia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025 (2017)).
320 Josh Blackman has collected many of these cases. See Josh Blackman, The “Essential”
Free Exercise Clause, 44 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 637, 647–61 (2021).
321 See Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66 (2020).
322 See id. at 66–67.
323 See, e.g., Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 495 F. Supp. 3d 118, 127,
129–31 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“[N]early every court to consider the issue has followed suit and
applied a rational basis analysis to free exercise challenges to COVID-related restrictions on
religious gatherings.”), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo, 983 F.3d
620, 625 (2d Cir. 2020).
324 See Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 67.
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restrictions struck “at the very heart of the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious liberty.”325 The Court found that New York’s rules were:
far more restrictive than any COVID-related regulations that have previously come before the Court, much tighter than those adopted by many
other jurisdictions hard-hit by the pandemic, and far more severe than has
been shown to be required to prevent the spread of the virus at the applicants’ services.326

While this analysis was technically conducted in line with Smith,
the Court curiously did not rely on Smith (it cited Lukumi instead).327
Lower courts have already suggested that Diocese of Brooklyn “represented a seismic shift in Free Exercise law” and compels application of
strict scrutiny far more broadly than lower courts had previously
thought.328
Cass Sunstein has called the decision in Diocese of Brooklyn “our
anti-Korematsu,” arguing that it is “a strong signal of judicial solicitude
for constitutional rights and of judicial willingness to protect against
discrimination, even under emergency circumstances in which life is
on the line.”329 As discussed above, Korematsu is a Thayerian decision
characterized by deference to the government in an emergency. Sunstein, however, emphasized the Court’s unwillingness to defer to the
political branches: “The most noteworthy feature of the per curiam
opinion is the absence of deference to state officials in a context in
which deference might well be expected.”330 This is the opposite of
the Thayerism observable in Korematsu, prompting Sunstein’s label of
Diocese of Brooklyn as the “anti-Korematsu.”
The Court followed Diocese of Brooklyn with a per curiam decision
about a California COVID-19 restriction on in-home worship in Tandon v. Newsom.331 Again the Court rejected deference to government
officials. Instead, it explained that strict scrutiny would apply—and the
government would bear the burden of proving its claims—“whenever
they treat any comparable secular activity more favorably than religious
exercise.”332
Notably absent from Tandon was any suggestion that the Court
would or should merely defer to government choices, so long as they

325 Id. at 68.
326 Id. at 67.
327 Id.
328 Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 982 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 2020).
329 Cass R. Sunstein, Our Anti-Korematsu, 2021 AM. J.L. & EQUAL. 221, 222, 232.
330 Id. at 225. Sunstein argues that this rejection of deference to the political branches
is “of potentially enduring importance.” Id. at 222.
331 See Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1297 (2021).
332 Id. at 1296.
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are rational. To the contrary, Tandon is quite clear that even if a government distinction might be rational, it is only permissible if the government carries its burden of satisfying strict scrutiny.333 As with Diocese
of Brooklyn, Tandon confirms that—even in the face of a pandemic—
the Court will enforce the Free Exercise Clause and not simply defer
to rational decisions of political actors.
*

*

*

As with the church autonomy cases, then, the Court’s discussions
of the Free Exercise Clause in the marriage, Blaine Amendment, and
COVID-19 contexts cannot be reconciled with the Thayerian deference of Gobitis. Rather than deferring to merely rational laws imposed
by political actors, these cases suggest an understanding of that clause
as an important, and judicially enforceable, protection for a “fundamental” right. And this nondeferential, judicially enforceable protection applies even in the face of important general laws, and even in
emergency circumstances that might otherwise be expected to prompt
deference. “[E]ven in a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put
away and forgotten,” but remains to be enforced by the courts.334 That
strong, judicial protection enables the Free Exercise Clause to function
as an important “guarantee” of pluralism, even in the face of contrary
majoritarian decisions on our most contentious issues. The Gobitisdriven alternative of a First Amendment characterized by judicial deference to majoritarian legislature could hardly be said to “lie[] at the
heart of our pluralistic society.”335
C. Establishment Clause Cases
From the outset, Justice Frankfurter was concerned about the relationship between the Establishment Clause and his Gobitis approach
to the First Amendment. If courts were not limited to the Gobitis approach of deferring to the legislature, Justice Frankfurter feared that

333 Id. at 1297–98 (“This is the fifth time the Court has summarily rejected the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis of California’s COVID restrictions on religious exercise. It is unsurprising
that such litigants are entitled to relief. California’s Blueprint System contains myriad exceptions and accommodations for comparable activities, thus requiring the application of
strict scrutiny.” (first citing Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 889 (2020)
(mem.); then citing S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021);
then citing Gish v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1290 (2021) (mem.); and then citing Gateway City
Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1460 (2021) (mem.))).
334 Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 68 (2020).
335 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
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public schools would be unable to require school days to begin with
readings from the Bible.336
Of course, Justice Frankfurter eventually lost that fight, both in
Barnette itself and on the issue of Bible reading in public schools. By
the early 1960s, in reliance on Barnette, the Court rejected requirements of daily Bible reading, just as Justice Frankfurter had feared.337
In particular, the Court emphasized in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp that the mere “consent of the majority” was not enough
to overcome the First Amendment, which had put such issues “beyond
the reach of majorities” and “establish[ed] them as legal principles to
be applied by the courts.”338
The Establishment Clause cases of the past decade have featured
some division and fracturing over exactly how the Court should implement that principle, and how to determine what exactly amounts to an
impermissible establishment of religion. But in most circumstances
there appears to be unanimity that the test is not simply to apply
Thayerian deference to any reasonable legislative judgment.
First, in Town of Greece v. Galloway, a divided Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a legislative prayer practice in Greece,
New York.339 While the Justices were divided 5–4 as to whether the
Establishment Clause had been violated, they were unanimous in embracing a view of the First Amendment that positions the Constitution—and the Court—as an important guarantor of minority rights in
a religiously pluralistic society.340 This is, of course, the Barnette view of
the First Amendment rather than the deferential Thayer/Gobitis approach.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy explained that the
Town’s legislative prayers did not violate the First Amendment in part
because they did not “denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities”
which “would present a different case.”341 Echoing Barnette, the majority explained that the government cannot “prescribe a religious orthodoxy,” and that legislative prayer practices should instead “strive for
the idea that people of many faiths may be united in a community of
336 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 659 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Frankfurter’s concern here likely was not the result of personal religious fervor, given that he described himself as “reverent agnostic.” PHILLIPS, supra note 9, at 291.
337 See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963).
338 Id. at 225–26 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638). The Bible reading in Schempp was
required for the school, but individual students were permitted to refrain from participation; the Court still invalidated it, citing Barnette. See id. at 205–07.
339 See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 568–70 (2014).
340 See id. at 591; id. at 603 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 610 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id.
at 630 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
341 Id. at 583 (majority opinion).
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tolerance and devotion.”342 The majority further emphasized that coercion by the government would be unacceptable, but that “[o]ur tradition assumes that adult citizens, firm in their own beliefs, can tolerate
and perhaps appreciate a ceremonial prayer delivered by a person of
a different faith.”343 The prayers at issue had been said by members of
a variety of different faiths including Christian ministers, a Jewish layman, a Wiccan priestess, and a Baha’i temple chairman.344 In short,
the Court acknowledged that the legislative majority was barred from
imposing religious orthodoxy, but did not think such imposition had
occurred.
Justice Kagan’s dissent likewise embraced the Barnette idea of the
First Amendment as an important, and judicially enforceable, protection for religious pluralism. Writing for the four dissenting Justices,
Kagan emphasized the Constitution’s “remarkable” and “momentous
offering” to people of all faiths: “that however those individuals worship, they will count as full and equal American citizens.”345 Justice
Kagan dissented because she believed the town’s practices violated
“the breathtakingly generous constitutional idea that our public institutions belong no less to the Buddhist or Hindu than to the Methodist
or Episcopalian.”346 The dissenters emphasized that they did not think
town meetings must “become a religion-free zone,” but rather that
“pluralism and inclusion in a town hall can satisfy the constitutional
requirement of neutrality.”347
What is notable here is that all nine Justices in Town of Greece were
operating from a set of common premises, all of which are the antithesis of Thayerian deference. All treated the Constitution as having an
important role to play protecting minorities and religious pluralism—
a role disavowed by Gobitis and Smith, but embraced by Barnette. All
appeared to presume that judicial enforcement of the First Amendment is a central part of that protection. All agreed that the government cannot impose orthodoxy. None suggested that the courts
should only be looking for mere legislative rationality when the legislative majority has enacted a general law. In short, while the Town of
Greece decision was 5–4, there appeared to be 9–0 agreement on an
anti-Thayerian approach to the Establishment Clause.
Five years later, in American Legion v. American Humanist Association, the Court decided that it did not violate the Establishment Clause
342
343
344
345
346
347

Id. at 581, 584.
Id. at 584, 583–84.
See id. at 572.
Id. at 615 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 616.
Id.
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for a Maryland town to keep a forty-foot cross on public property as a
memorial for soldiers who died in World War I.348 As in Town of Greece,
the Court split 7–2.349 Likewise, the opinions confirmed that all nine
of the Justices view the Religion Clauses as designed to provide important protection for religious minorities.
For example, the majority explained its view that the “Religion
Clauses of the Constitution aim to foster a society in which people of
all beliefs can live together harmoniously.”350 Further, the Court also
explained that tearing down or moving the cross “would not be neutral
and would not further the ideals of respect and tolerance embodied in
the First Amendment.”351 The Court’s view of the Religion Clauses
here is, once again, irreconcilable with the approach set forth in Gobitis, which offered no protection to religious minorities against majority-imposed orthodoxy. The First Amendment could not adequately
protect pluralism in this way if it gives minorities no protection against
even barely rational majoritarian power.
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissented, making clear that
they disagreed with the case’s outcome. But they took no issue with the
claim that the Religion Clauses are designed to allow people of all beliefs to live together in harmony. Indeed, the dissenters asserted that
the Establishment Clause is “designed to preserve individual liberty
and civic harmony” by keeping the government neutral between religions.352 And they lamented even “the indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities to conform” to any majority-imposed religious orthodoxy.353
The majority and dissent in American Legion, therefore, disagreed
about the correct outcome of the case because they disagreed about
the application of these principles. But all nine Justices agreed that
the Religion Clauses are designed to allow for people of varying beliefs
to live together in harmony and without forced conformity imposed
on religious minorities. In other words, while reaching different conclusions on the facts of the case, the Justices exhibited broad agreement in thinking about religious liberty as a Barnette-style right to be
enforced by the Court for the protection of minorities. A Gobitis approach of Thayerian deference to all nonirrational legislative actions
would have offered no such protection.

348
349
350
351
352
353

See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019).
See id. at 2074, 2090, 2092, 2103.
Id. at 2074.
Id. at 2090.
Id. at 2104 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2105 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
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In 2022, the Supreme Court struck down two separate Establishment Clause defenses made by government entities. First, in Shurtleff
v. City of Boston, the Court on free speech grounds ruled that Boston
could not reject a request to fly the Christian flag due to its religious
nature.354 For years, Boston had frequently allowed private groups to
fly a flag of their choosing on a flagpole outside of City Hall.355 The
city permitted hundreds of requests, and did not deny a single one until a group called Camp Constitution requested to fly a Christian flag.356
The city argued it was avoiding a violation of the Establishment Clause,
as flying a flag at City Hall would be an expression of government
speech.357 The Court unanimously rejected such a stance, holding it is
essential to prevent the government from denying private speech solely
on the grounds that the speech is religious.358 Justice Kavanaugh, in
concurrence, affirms a Barnette understanding of the Religion Clauses
by stating the government may not treat religious individuals and organizations “as second-class.”359
Second, the Court ruled in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District that
the Establishment Clause does not preclude a public school coach
from participating in individual, noncoercive prayer.360 Bremerton, in
seeking to avoid violating the Establishment Clause, curtailed Kennedy’s right to pray at the fifty-yard line following a football game.361 A
6–3 majority held that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of
the First Amendment had complimentary, rather than adversarial
roles, where one must dominate the other.362 While public school
coaches and teachers have public-facing roles, the Court noted the importance of protecting these individuals’ right to noncoercive, private
expressions of faith.363 In doing so, the Court invoked a Barnette-style
approach to protecting religious expression, with the First Amendment providing judicially enforceable protection against “government
attempts to regulate religion and suppress dissent.”364 The Court emphasized the importance of these rights particularly for minorities—
emphasizing the example of a Muslim teacher who could be fired “for
wearing a headscarf” or a Jewish teacher for wearing a yarmulke—and
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364

See Shurtleff v. City of Bos., 142 S. Ct. 1583, 1587 (2022)
See id. at 1587.
See id.
Id. at 1593.
See id. at 1587.
Id. at 1595 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2433 (2022).
See id. at 2417–18.
See id. at 2421.
See id. at 2423.
Id. at 2421.
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explained that “learning how to tolerate speech or prayer of all kinds
is ‘part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society,’ a trait of character essential to ‘a tolerant citizenry.’”365 Together, Town of Greece, American Legion, Shurtleff, and Kennedy all show the Court treating the First
Amendment’s religious freedom protections—both the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause—as important, judicially enforceable protections against the majority. None advances the Gobitis view
that religious restrictions should be permissible upon a mere showing
of rational basis.
There is one exception to this trend: the Court’s 2018 decision in
Trump v. Hawaii.366 In Trump, a 5–4 majority upheld a presidential order preventing the entry into the United States of certain foreign nationals of eight countries.367 The majority found that the decision
whether to admit foreign nationals implicated “a fundamental act of
sovereignty” that is “within the core of executive responsibility.”368 Accordingly, the Court found that ordinary constitutional principles did
not apply, and instead the Court would only look for a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason, and would not “look behind the exercise
of that discretion.”369
Based on this extraordinarily deferential approach, the Court “assume[d]” that, at most, it could apply “rational basis review” to determine whether the government’s actions were plausibly related to legitimate government interests.370 The majority emphasized that this deferential approach was not ordinary Establishment Clause review, but
rather a special standard for the particular circumstance at issue. 371
Based on this standard, the court upheld the restriction.372 This is the
closest the Court has come to Thayerian deference in the religious liberty area in the past decade.

365 Id. at 2425, 2430–31 (quoting Lee v. Weisman ex rel. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590
(1992)). The Court went on to emphasize that “[r]espect for religious expressions is indispensable to life in a free and diverse Republic” and protected by both the free speech and
free exercise clauses. Id. at 2432–33.
366 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
367 See id. at 2403, 2423.
368 Id. at 2407, 2418 (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,
542 (1950)).
369 Id. at 2419 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769, 770 (1972)). The
Court emphasized that this deferential review was the same level of review it had applied in
a prior free speech case concerning a denial of entry. See id. (citing Mandel, 408 U.S. at
753).
370 Id. at 2420.
371 See id. at 2418 (“The case before us differs in numerous respects from the conventional Establishment Clause claim.”).
372 See id. at 2423.
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Writing in dissent for herself and Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor argued both that the restrictions should have been subjected
to more rigorous scrutiny and that they failed even rational basis review.373 Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority for applying rational
basis review “without explanation or precedential support” where “a
more stringent standard of review” was required.374 Further, she emphasized that use of rational basis scrutiny amounted to “throw[ing]
the Establishment Clause out the window” and “forgo[ing] any meaningful constitutional review.”375
The majority, of course, disagreed with Justice Sotomayor’s criticism of their use of rational basis.376 But they did not disagree with the
contention that rational basis is extraordinarily deferential. To the
contrary, they emphasized that “it should come as no surprise that the
Court hardly ever strikes down a policy as illegitimate under rational
basis scrutiny.”377 The majority did not apply rational basis because it
understood that to be the usual Establishment Clause standard, but
because it understood the particular situation to be an exceptional circumstance, warranting deference akin to Thayerism.378
*

*

*

The trio of Establishment Clause cases decided over the past decade thus confirms the general victory of an anti-Thayerian approach to
the First Amendment over a deferential Gobitis-style approach. Even
where the Justices disagree on outcomes, they all appear to be operating from the same premise that the Religion Clauses are supposed to
be judicially enforceable protections and, in virtually all circumstances,
to call for something greater than mere rationality review. Even in the
lone case to use rational basis, the Justices appear to agree that such
deference is generally inappropriate for constitutional claims.
373 See id. at 2441 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
374 See id.
375 Id. at 2441 n.6.
376 See id. at 2419 (majority opinion).
377 Id. at 2420.
378 See id. at 2418. For an argument that Trump v. Hawaii would have had a better
chance of triggering heightened scrutiny had the case been argued under the Free Exercise
Clause, rather than the Establishment Clause, see Brief Amicus Curiae of the Becket Fund
for Religious Liberty in Support of Neither Party at 5–6, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392
(2018) (No. 17-965) (“The lower courts’ use of the wrong Clause and the wrong test have
led them to decide important questions of First Amendment rights and national security by
relying on inferences about the state of mind of a single government official. . . . Because
the Proclamation’s constitutionality under the First Amendment has not properly been litigated below, the case should be remanded, and Respondents should be given the chance
to litigate their thus far undeveloped Free Exercise claim.”).
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D. Federal Statutory Cases
Interspersed with the constitutional cases described above, the
Court also decided a host of federal statutory religious liberty cases
during the past decade. These cases involved a wide range of statutes:
RFRA,379 RLUIPA,380 and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.381 And
they involved a wide range of factual circumstances: healthcare mandates,382 prison conditions,383 employment,384 interstate travel,385 and
capital punishment.386 Across these diverse contexts and statutes, an
obvious trend emerged—every religious plaintiff won, many in unanimous decisions. As relevant to our discussion, three themes emerge
from these statutory cases that make them relevant to our constitutional analysis: courts can apply strict scrutiny; anarchy does not result
from judicial scrutiny; and the Court continues to resist appeals to
Smith and deference to political branches.
First, these statutory cases demonstrate the Court’s ability to apply
strict scrutiny. Smith had feared that a nondeferential approach like
strict scrutiny would require courts to “weigh the social importance of
all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs”387 and would
“court[] anarchy.”388 But these statutory cases confirm that courts can
and do apply strict scrutiny without trying to “weigh” such imponderables without sowing anarchy. Nor do they turn themselves into
“board[s] for answering legislative conundrums” as Thayer had
feared.389

379 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688–90 (2014).
380 See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356 (2015).
381 See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 771 (2015).
382 See Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. at 688–91.
383 See Holt, 574 U.S. at 355.
384 See Abercrombie & Fitch, 575 U.S. at 770.
385 See Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 489 (2020).
386 See Ramirez v. Collier, 142 S. Ct. 1264, 1268 (2022).
387 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). To Smith, avoiding this task was precisely why rational basis “must be preferred”—even if it leaves religious minorities at a disadvantage:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place
at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in;
but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred
to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh
the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
Id.
388 Id. at 888 (“Any society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, but that
danger increases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs . . . .”).
389 Thayer, supra note 5, at 146.

NDL106_RIENZI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

11/7/2022 1:32 PM

395

For example, the Court has decided three RFRA cases concerning
the federal contraceptive coverage mandate.390 In the most prominent
of the trio, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court had no difficulty
applying strict scrutiny—and did so without “weighing” the centrality
of all religious beliefs against the importance of all laws.391 Instead, the
Court simply found that the burdened religious exercise was sincere
and looked to see whether the government was using the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling interest.392 The Court assumed
that the government had a compelling interest in distributing contraceptives, but found that the government did not need to force unwilling employers to pay for the coverage.393 It found that “[t]he most
straightforward way of doing this would be for the Government to assume the cost” for anyone unable to obtain them because of an employer’s religious objection.394
To be sure, the defendants and dissenters predicted that ruling
for the religious parties would “lead to a flood of religious objections.”395 But empirical research shows that no such flood occurred at
all—to the contrary, religious liberty claims and victories remain
scarce.396 Thus the Court expressed no trepidation about resulting

390 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct.
2367, 2372–73 (2020); Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. 403, 405–06 (2016); Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688–91 (2014).
391 See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 691–92.
392 See id. at 726–31. The dissenters too recognized that strict scrutiny did not allow
them to “question the centrality of a particular religious exercise.” Id. at 748 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
393 See id. at 726–31 (majority opinion).
394 Id. at 728. The Court further explained that the regulatory method of compliance
the federal government had created for religious nonprofits would also be less restrictive of
Hobby Lobby’s religious liberty. See id. at 730. That method was subsequently enjoined
when challenged by nonprofits, see Zubik, 578 U.S. at 409, and revised to become optional
by the federal government after the Supreme Court “directed” the government to “accommodat[e]” objections to that process. Little Sisters, 140 S. Ct. at 2383 (alteration in original)
(quoting Zubik, 578 U.S. at 408).
395 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 732.
396 See, e.g., Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N. Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An
Empirical Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 353, 356 (2018)
(“Contrary to predictions that Hobby Lobby would open the floodgates of religious liberty
litigation, these cases remain scarce, making up only 0.6% of the federal docket. And contrary to predictions that religious people would be able to wield Hobby Lobby as a trump card,
successful cases are even scarcer . . . .”); Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied Challenges? A Defense of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV.
1595, 1639 (2018) (“Our findings do not indicate that government win rates have undergone a dramatic change since Hobby Lobby.”); cf. Stephen Cranney, Are Christians More Likely
to Invoke RFRA—and Win—than Other Religions Since Hobby Lobby?, 72 MERCER L. REV. 585,
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anarchy when it recently held in Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and
Paul Home v. Pennsylvania that the entire federal government needs to
consider RFRA in all of its actions,397 or when it unanimously held in
Tanzin v. Tanvir that Muslim men, who claimed they were wrongfully
included on the no-fly list, could pursue RFRA damages against officials in their personal capacities.398
The Court has likewise shown no hesitation about applying strict
scrutiny under RLUIPA. In Holt v. Hobbs, the Court applied strict scrutiny to require the Arkansas prison system to allow a Muslim inmate to
grow a half-inch beard for religious reasons.399 The unanimous Court
refused to simply defer to the government, particularly where most
other prison systems allowed such beards without jeopardizing prison
safety.400 And the Holt precedent was recently used by Justice Kagan to
explain why strict scrutiny required Alabama to refrain from carrying
out an execution without allowing the prisoner access to clergy.401
There is no indication that either allowing short beards for religious
reasons or allowing access to clergy in the death chamber has resulted
in anarchy or safety problems.402 Thus although these cases did not
involve direct applications of Smith, they provided the Court with
593 (2021) (reviewing datasets and concluding that RFRA “is primarily used to protect less
privileged minority religions”).
397 See Little Sisters, 140 S. Ct. at 2383 (finding “Congress’ intent beyond dispute” that
federal agencies must consider RFRA in the implementation of federal law). Prior to the
Court’s holding in Little Sisters, some lower courts had asserted that agencies lacked authority to independently interpret and apply RFRA. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F.
Supp. 3d 791, 822 (E.D. Pa. 2019), aff’d sub nom. Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d
543 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Little Sisters, 140 S. Ct. at 2367.
398 See Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 489 (2020). In Tanzin, the Court was considering the claim of three Muslim men who alleged they had wrongfully been placed on the
federal “No Fly List” because they had refused to serve as government informants on members of their religious congregation. See id.
399 See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 357–58 (2015) (noting that Smith had “largely repudiated the method of analysis used in prior free exercise cases like” Yoder and Sherbert,
but that RLUIPA is designed to provide “expansive protection for religious liberty”).
400 See id. at 368–69. The Court emphasized that it did not believe the application of
strict scrutiny would hamper prison security, because strict scrutiny still “affords prison officials ample ability to maintain security” while also respecting religious exercise. Id. at 369.
401 See Dunn v. Smith, 141 S. Ct. 725, 725 (2021) (mem.) (Kagan, J., concurring in
denial of application to vacate injunction)
402 See id. (“But past practice, in Alabama and elsewhere, shows that a prison may ensure security without barring all clergy members from the execution chamber. Until two
years ago, Alabama required the presence of a prison chaplain at an inmate’s side.”); accord
id. at 727 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of application to vacate injunction) (asserting that if states wish to avoid RLUIPA litigation, they “should figure out a way to allow
spiritual advisors into the execution room, as other States and the Federal Government
have done”).
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repeated opportunities to apply and discuss strict scrutiny, which was
one of the primary concerns of the Smith majority.
The Court recently ruled in another prisoner’s rights case—
Ramirez v. Collier—that individuals during an execution ought to have
the right to have their minister lay hands on their body while audibly
praying.403 As in Holt, the Court applied strict scrutiny under
RLUIPA.404 Texas requested deference on execution policy determinations, citing security in the execution chamber, among other reasons, as a governmental interest to not have a minister physically touching Ramirez.405 However, an 8–1 court did not find such a reason sufficient. Complete bans on audible prayer and touch were not the least
restrictive means to fulfill such an interest.406 Failure to accommodate
an individual’s religious beliefs in their last hours presents irreparable
harm that compensation to one’s estate could not remedy.407
One statutory case did involve a direct appeal to Smith. In EEOC
v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., the popular clothing store had refused to hire a Muslim teenager because her religious observance of
wearing a hijab or headscarf would conflict with the store’s “no-headwear” policy.408 Attempting to defend the exclusion against a Title VII
claim of religious discrimination, Abercrombie invoked Smith to argue
that “generally applicable rules that happen to burden religion” are
unproblematic.409
Rejecting this invocation of Smith, the Court explained that Title
VII does not “limit disparate-treatment claims to only those employer
policies that treat religious practices less favorably than similar secular
practices.”410 The Court left open the possibility that such a rule “may”
work in “other contexts,” but found that Title VII “does not demand
mere neutrality with regard to religious practices.”411 Title VII instead
protects religious exercise by giving “favored treatment” and often requires that otherwise neutral polices “give way to the need for an accommodation.”412

403 Ramirez v. Collier, 142 S. Ct. 1264, 1284 (2022).
404 See id. at 1277.
405 See id. at 1280.
406 See id.
407 See id. at 1282.
408 EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 770 (2015).
409 Brief for Respondent at 25, 24–26, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575
U.S. 768 (2015) (No. 14-86).
410 Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 775.
411 Id.
412 Id.
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While these nonconstitutional cases do not directly test whether
the Court is using the Thayerian deferential approach revived in Smith,
they allow us to see the Court repeatedly protecting religious exercise.
More specifically, these statutes repeatedly place the Court in the exact
position Thayer, Hand, Gobitis, and Smith all suggested would be most
problematic: applying heightened scrutiny to general laws enacted by
the majority. The Court exhibits no discomfort with this assigned task,
nowhere suggests that its efforts court anarchy, and is willing to insist
both to governments and to private employers that they must often
accommodate religious exercise from burdensome general rules.
CONCLUSION: DEFERENCE, PLURALISM, AND SMITH
Understanding the Court’s religious liberty cases through the lens
of deference provides an important insight into what Justice Kagan
rightly called our Constitution’s “momentous offering” to the millions
who “have come to this country from every corner of the world to share
in the blessing of religious freedom.”413 That blessing is built on the
First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, including the constitutional
promise of free exercise, which the Court recently recognized as at
“the heart of our pluralistic society.”414
For decades it has been obvious that, at least as a general matter,
there are no takers on the Court or in the academy for application of
mere rational basis review when governments infringe fundamental
rights. Thayer and Hand proposed such a deferential approach, but
there is little doubt that the Barnette approach controls. Barnette replaced Gobitis and its Thayerian deference to legislative majorities with
an understanding of the Bill of Rights as a set of “legal principles to be
applied by the courts.”415 No one seems to want to turn back, and the
occasional case in which the Court applies rational basis now prompts
dissenting Justices to liken the practice to throwing the First Amendment “out the window” and “forgo[ing] any meaningful constitutional
review.”416
Barnette’s rejection of Gobitis and its embrace of the judicial enforcement of rights controls in virtually all areas of modern constitutional law. Few would dispute Cass Sunstein’s characterization of

413
414
415
416

Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 615 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2441 n.6 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Barnette as “what American constitutional law is all about,”417 at least
when it comes to the enforcement of rights. This is why Barnette is
invoked even outside of the First Amendment when the Court wrestles
with how to protect rights. To borrow a line from Barnette, “[t]he very
purpose” of constitutional rights is to identify circumstances in which
courts should not defer to political actors and, instead, enforce constitutional principles that are binding on majoritarian government.418
For years, Smith’s surprising reliance on Gobitis rather than Barnette
created an anomaly: How could the “the heart of our pluralistic society” be a Free Exercise Clause so hobbled by deference to merely rational government action? How could the “momentous offering” of
religious liberty be so stingy as to often leave minority rights unprotected as the “unavoidable consequence” of majority power?419 How
could that version of the Bill of Rights plausibly protect the minority
from majoritarian power?
When we consider religious liberty law through the lens of deference, we can see that the Court’s recent religious liberty cases have
begun to provide answers to these questions. Working in virtually every
area of religious liberty law, the Court has repeatedly embraced a Barnette-style understanding of religious liberty, rejecting the notion of
Thayerian deference. Outside of Trump v. Hawaii, the Court has not
deferred to merely rational judgments of the political branches.420
There is broad agreement on the Court that rationality review is insufficient for protecting important religious liberty rights. And there appears to be little concern on the Court that judicial application of strict
scrutiny—the spectre of which drove Smith’s embrace of Gobitis—is actually sowing anarchy. In fact, the Justices seem convinced of the opposite: that serious enforcement of free exercise is a crucial component of the Constitution’s ability to promote social peace in a pluralistic society. As Michael McConnell has argued at length elsewhere,
the most logical result of a pluralistic approach to the Free Exercise
Clause is not Smith but religious exemptions.421
So what will become of Smith? Only two possibilities seem plausible. One is that the Court will soon reverse Smith, and thereby

417 Sunstein, supra note 174.
418 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
419 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
420 And even in Trump, there was broad agreement that rational basis is extremely deferential review not applicable to ordinary Establishment Clause claims. See Trump, 138 S.
Ct. at 2418–20; id. at 2441 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
421 McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 18, at 1516 (stating
“[t]he Madisonian perspective points toward pluralism” as the animating principle of the
Free Exercise Clause).
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eliminate the last remaining vestige of the Gobitis-style approach to fundamental rights. This would certainly be consistent with the cases of
the past decade, and several Justices in Fulton appear quite open to that
path. It would not be a surprise to see the Court reverse Smith and
embrace a more protective understanding of the Free Exercise Clause,
even if there is some uncertainty on the Court about how a replacement for Smith would play out in various circumstances. In fact, Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh openly suggested in Fulton that perhaps
Smith’s rule should not be replaced by a single categorical rule.422
The second possibility is that, even with the Gobitis approach so
clearly defunct, Smith will survive a bit longer, perhaps governing a
much narrower range of cases than previously thought. Scholars have
long pointed out that Smith’s focus on laws that are “neutral” and “generally applicable”423 leaves room for argument about whether most
laws qualify for Smith’s rational basis rule or not.424 Perhaps the Court
will deal with the incongruence of Smith by finding that Smith is more
the exception than the rule. For example, the Court could nominally
preserve Smith, but decide, as it did in Trump v. Hawaii, that it only
governs a very small, exceptional set of cases for which a rational basis
rule can apply. The Court’s recent decisions in Tandon and Fulton certainly accomplish some of that work, eschewing deference any time the
government allows secular exemptions (Tandon) or reserves discretion
to create exemptions (Fulton).
Either way, one thing seems clear: After a decade of developing
all aspects of its religious liberty jurisprudence, the Court has left Smith
looking rather isolated—a lonely island of Gobitis-style deference in
what is otherwise a Barnette-controlled sea of judicially-enforced constitutional rights.
We live in deeply divided times. The Court seems well aware that
we need a fully operational First Amendment that allows free people
with divergent views to live and work together in peace. While the Justices will of course disagree on particular applications, they share
broad agreement that the Religion Clauses exist to “foster a society in
which people of all beliefs can live together harmoniously.”425 The Religion Clauses can only play that role if the Court continues its movement away from Thayerian deference and toward the notion that the

422 See Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (2021) (Barrett, J., concurring).
423 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
424 Douglas Laycock & Steven T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law and the Free Exercise of
Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1, 11 (2016) (noting a circuit split and wide variance in the lower
courts over how to determine general applicability under Smith).
425 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019).
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entire Bill of Rights, including the Religion Clauses, imposes legal principles that can and should be enforced by courts.

